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INTRODUCTION
Feminist criticism of criminal law and criminal justice adminis-
tration has proliferated over the past decade and now touches
scores of doctrinal, practical, and theoretical issues. These critiques
and the associated proposals for reform are usually acknowledged
to be controversial (and even "radical") by proponents and
opponents alike. Yet, across a wide range of issues, the feminist
position has its basis in a simple fact that cannot be considered
debatable: criminal law is, from top to bottom, preoccupied with
male concerns and male perspectives.
In this Article, I explain why this seemingly tendentious claim is
not only accurate but uncontroversial. I then seek to show how the
male orientation of existing criminal law creates both the necessity
for reform and a major obstacle to doing it well.
The feminist challenge is to adapt male-oriented criminal
laws and practices to the concerns of a group of victims and
offenders who are normally left out of the picture. This turns
out to be difficult, and not just because of a lack of empathy
for the needs of women. Factoring female victims and female
offenders into the criminal law equation is hard because of many
conflicting concerns and commitments that most Americans share.
Three conflicts in particular will be central to the discussion that
follows.
First, although we want women to be treated the same as men,
sometimes equality cannot be achieved by treating two groups of
people the same way. We need to take differences into account.
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Yet drawing categorical distinctions between men and women
undermines our ideals. This is the familiar debate concerning
sameness versus difference. It pervades discussions of gender in
other areas of the law and discussions of equal treatment for racial
minorities, the handicapped, and other groups. The debate plays
out with some unexpected twists in criminal justice.
A second dilemma is that we want to be sensitive to the nuances
of context when gender issues are at stake. But effective protection
of women also requires that women have clear-cut rights protected
by clear rules. This is the old debate concerning rules versus
discretion. Again, it plays out with some unexpected twists in
criminal justice.
A third dilemma concerns the limits of theory. We need theory
to help pinpoint the problems confronting women and to help
organize thinking about solutions. But theory is not up to the task.
Indeed, I will argue that in criminal justice, theory can never be
equal to the task.
Much of contemporary feminist discussion and scholarship
center on developing new theories or on parsing the differences
among theories and defending commitments to one of them or
another. One theory emphasizes formally equal treatment.2  A
major competitor is a theory stressing the ways that culture and
social practice subordinate women under laws that are formally
neutral.' A third theory emphasizes context, caring, and connec-
tion in lieu of what it views as a "male" commitment to abstract
rights defined without regard to context. 4 One scholar has iden-
1 See, e.g., MARTHA MINOW, MAKING ALL THE DIFFERENCE: INCLUSION, EXCLUSION,
AND AMERICAN LAW 21 (1990) ("The dilemma of difference grows from the ways in
which this society assigns individuals to categories and, on that basis, determines
whom to include in and whom to exclude from political, social, and economic
activities.").
2 See, e.g., Wendy W. Williams, The Equality Crisis: Some Reflections on Culture,
Courts, and Feminism, 7 WOMEN'S RTS. L. REP. 175, 175 (1982) (stating that courts
should "rule that the privileges the law explicitly bestows on men must also be made
available to women"); Wendy W. Williams, Notes from a First Generation, 1989 U. CHI.
LEGAL F. 99, 99 (identifying the "'formal' equality" approach as "an insistence that
laws not embody explicit sex-based distinctions").
3 See, e.g., CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, FEMINISM UNMODIFIED: DISCOURSES ON
LIFE AND LAW 40 (1987) (discussing the "dominance approach" to the equality
question); Christine A. Littleton, Reconstructing Sexual Equality, 75 CAL. L. REV. 1279,
1282-84 (1987) (noting that courts routinely apply "phallocentric standards 'equally'
to men and women's different reproductive biology or economic position to yield...
unequal results for women").
4 See, e.g., CAROL GILLIGAN, IN A DIFFERENT VOICE: PSYCHOLOGICAL THEORY AND
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tified seven distinct feminisms: liberal, radical, marxist, social-
ist, psychoanalytic, existentialist, and post-modem.5  And that
taxonomy still leaves out a few.6 We can say, with only slight
exaggeration, that feminist legal theory and feminist jurisprudence
have become synonyms for feminist scholarship in law schools
today.
7,
I do not attempt here to define and distinguish the many varie-
ties of feminist theory because I wish to draw attention to a prob-
lem that is common to all of them. The difficulty, not a new one,
is that broad propositions do not solve concrete cases; or they solve
too many cases very poorly. The problems confronting women in
criminal justice run so deep and have such complex links to the
goals and structures of law that theory is inherently incapable of
carrying us very far along the path toward effective solutions. The
problems can be worked out only by paying close attention to
particulars.
I begin this Article by describing how the criminal justice
system is dominated (incontrovertibly so) by a preoccupation with
men and male perspectives. I then focus on four problems that
particularly concern women as potential victims or offenders-
domestic violence, rape, sentencing policy, and prisons. Finally,
drawing some common lessons from the four discussions, I suggest
the need for a rather skeptical attitude toward high theory in the
WOMEN'S DEVELOPMENT 17 (1982) (discussing the importance of the ethic of care to
women's self-definition).
5 See ROSEMARIE TONG, FEMINIST THOUGHT: A COMPREHENSIVE INTRODUCTION
1-8 (1989).
6 See, e.g., Katharine T. Bartlett, Feminist Legal Methods, 103 HARv. L. REV. 829,
836-67 (1990) (discussing feminist practical reasoning, consciousness-raising, and
related methods of epistemological inquiry).
7There are, to be sure, significant counterexamples: some recent legal scholar-
ship considers potential reform with a close eye on the institutional or doctrinal
specifics of legal change. See, e.g., Mary E. Becker, Politics, Differences and Economic
Rights, 1989 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 169, 171 (discussing the economic effects of formal
equality); Herma H. Kay, Equality and Difference: A Perspective on No-Fault Divorce and
Its Aftermath, 56 U. CIN. L. REV. 1, 3 (1987) (exploring the concrete effect of no-fault
divorce reforms); Jane E. Larson, "Women Understand So Little, They Call My Good
Nature 'Deceit'". A Feminist Rethinking of Seduction, 93 COLUM. L. REV. 374, 454-71
(1993) (examining specific elements of a legal cause of action for sexual fraud);
Deborah L. Rhode, Feminism and the State, 107 HARV. L. REV. 1181, 1195, 1197-98
(1994) (focusing on institutional details necessary to promote feminist goals in the
areas of physical security and equal employment opportunity). A related example,
largely pragmatic in tone, although not as detailed in its reform prescriptions, is
SUSAN ESTRICH, REAL RAPE 80-91 (1987) (discussingvarious reform statutes focusing
on the problem of rape).
1995] 2153
2154 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 143: 2151
search for a feminism that can guide reform in criminal justice
and, perhaps, other areas. Despite the undoubted importance of
theoretical insight, the most effective tools of reform at the
present juncture are likely to be eclectic and atheoretical, and
the most effective feminist scholarship is likely to be one that
attends to the complexities of specific institutions and procedures.
What is needed, I suggest, is a feminism of particulars, a recog-
nition that real solutions are likely to lie deeply embedded in the
details.
I. WHY CRIMINAL LAW IS "MALE"
The criminal justice system fits almost perfectly Lincoln's
conception of a government of the people, by the people, and for
the people. It fits perfectly, if you are willing to equate "the
people" with the male half of the population. Criminal law is-and
has been for centuries-a system of rules conceived and enforced by
men, for men, and against men.
There are counterexamples but not many. The law against pros-
titution, which might make sense as a way to protect young and
poor women from sexual exploitation, is not enforced that way. It
is enforced almost exclusively against women.8 The law notices
women but prosecutes those it should be protecting. In many
instances law enforcement does benefit and protect women. But
overwhelmingly, criminal law is designed and implemented with
men in mind.
This observation should be considered completely
uncontroversial. One way for the reader to confirm its accuracy is
simply to pause for a moment and attempt to picture a typical
offender. What does he look like? He is inevitably the subject of
the inquiry. The criminal offender is disproportionately male,
overwhelmingly so. In 1983, men and boys, 49% of the U.S.
8 See e.g., RICHARD SYMANSKI, THE IMMORAL LANDSCAPE: FEMALE PROSTITUTION
IN WESTERN SOCIETIES 88 (1981) (noting that although New York law was changed in
1964 to criminalize both male prostitution and the act of patronizinga prostitute, the
effect of the change was minimal; in 1977, the number of males arrested was less than
one-tenth the number of females arrested). Recent attention to the need for
sanctioning prostitutes' customers has not substantially changed this picture. See
Eleanor M. Miller et al., The United States, in PROSTITUTION: AN INTERNATIONAL
HANDBOOK ON TRENDS, PROBLEMS, AND POLICIES 300, 313 (Nanette J. Davis ed.,
1993) (noting the persistence of arrest patterns in which 70% of prostitution arrests
are of females, while male customers account for only about 10% of arrests).
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population, represented 78% of all property offenders and 89% of
all violent offenders.
9
What about victims? The Women's Movement has taught us to
be far more aware of the victimization of women, and there is a
widespread sense that women are disproportionately victimized
by violence.1" There is an important truth in that perception,
but it is a complex truth. It is a truth that statistics seem to
contradict.
The victims of reported crime are disproportionately male,
again overwhelmingly so. Justice Department statistics indicate that
compared to women, men are 123% more likely to be the victims of
robbery and 161% more likely to be the victims of an aggravated
assault.11
One's immediate reaction, given widespread perceptions of
disproportionate victimization of women, is that statistics of this
kind must be distorted, and in part this is true. The great majority
of victims of domestic violence are female. 12 Outside of prisons
and other custodial institutions, over 90% of rape victims are
9 See BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, REPORT TO THE
NATION ON CRIME AND JUSTICE 41 (2d ed. 1988) [hereinafter REPORT TO THE
NATION].
10 See S. REP. No. 197, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. 33 (1991) ("Women bear the
disproportionate burden of some of the most pernicious crimes, like rape, and some
of the most persistent crimes, like beatings in the home."); S. REP. No. 545, 101st
Cong., 2d Sess. 30-31 (1990) (noting "a spiralling 'gender gap' of violence... [in
which] female victimization is increasing faster than male victimization (at least for
some crimes)" (citations omitted)).
" See BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, CRIMINAL VICTIM-
IZATION 1991, at 6 (1992) [hereinafter VICTIMIZATION IN 1991].
12 In measuring domestic violence, a number of surveys suggest that male partners
are victimized at about the same rate as female partners. See MURRAY A. STRAUS ET
AL., BEHIND CLOSED DOORS: VIOLENCE IN THE AMERICAN FAMILY 266 (1980)
(reporting a rate of 12.0 for husband-to-wife violence compared to a rate of 11.5 for
wife-to-husband violence); Murray A. Straus & RichardJ. Gelles, Societal Change and
Change in Family Violence from 1975 to 1985: As Revealed by Two National Surveys, 48
J. MARRIAGE & FAM. 465, 470 (1986) (reporting that in 1985, the rate of husband-to-
wife violence was 113 per 1000 couples, while the rate of wife-to-husband violence
was 121 per 1000 couples). But the overall data on the rates of assault by victim
gender present a misleading picture because the assaults experienced by male victims
tend to be concentrated disproportionately in the milder forms of slapping or hit-
ting; the female partners are much more likely to suffer the most serious assaults. See
Irene H. Frieze & Angela Browne, Violence in Marriage, in FAMILY VIOLENCE 163,
181 (Michael Tonry & Norval Morris eds., 1989) (noting that "the average number of
severely violent assaults by a husband against a nonviolent wife was three times
greater than the average number of wives' assaults on nonviolent husbands").
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female.13 Yet rape and domestic violence are vastly underreported
and underprosecuted. 14
For other violent crimes, victimization rates are much higher for
males than for females, and reporting problems cannot explain all
of the difference. Household victimization surveys, a reasonably
effective check on underreporting (except for domestic violence),
show much higher victimization rates for men. 5 In homicide, an
offense for which victimization data are extremely reliable, we find
that men and boys, 49% of the population, represent 74% of
homicide victims.' 6 Over their lifetimes, men are about three
times more likely than women to become the victims of homi-
cide. 17 For an African-American man, the chance of becoming a
homicide victim is four-and-a-half times higher than for an African-
American woman, and sixteen times higher than for a white
woman. 18
Women's disproportionate victimization is nonetheless a reality,
but it is a complex one, rooted not only in raw numbers but in
judgments about the vulnerability of female victims and, perhaps,
"5 The Justice Department's household survey data indicate that only 8% of
reported rape victims are male, but these data do not include the rapes (largely male)
that occur in institutional settings, such as prisons. See BUREAU OFJUSTICE STATIS-
TICS, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, HIGHLIGHTS FROM 20 YEARS OF SURVEYING CRIME
VICTIMS 9 (1993). There are no reliable data on the incidence and prevalence of rape
in prisons, but some studies, extrapolating from crude survey data, estimate that
among inmates of prisons,jails, andjuvenile "reform schools," there may be as many
as 290,000 male rape victims per year. See Stephen Donaldson, The Rape Crisis Behind
Bays, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 29, 1993, at All. That figure is more than double the Bureau
ofJustice Statistics' estimate for the number of female rape victims annually, although
many believe that the number of female victims is much higher. See id. Inattention
to sexual assault in prisons does not only harm the men who are its immediate
victims; some observers believe that men and boys who are sexually victimized in
custodial institutions are more likely to become rapists themselves when they are
released. See id.
14See, e.g., S. REP. No. 197, at 38 (noting that "[r]ape and domestic
violence are some of the most underreported crimes in America"); S. REP. No. 545,
at 33 (noting witness testimony to the effect that "rape is still underreported
and underprosecuted"); MARGARET T. GORDON & STEPHANIE RICER, THE FEMALE
FEAR: THE SOCIAL COST OF RAPE 34-37 (1991) (discussing the underreporting of
rape).
15 See VICTIMIZATION IN 1991, supra note 11, at 6 (finding 40.3 violent crimes
against men per 1000 persons, but only 22.9 violent crimes against women per 1000
persons); REPORT To THE NATION, supra note 9, at 27 (reporting that while men suffer
assault at a rate of 32 per 1000 persons, women suffer assault at a rate of only 17 per




an assumption of some contributory fault with regard to many of
the victims on the male side: victims who provoked fights,
assumed risks, or went looking for trouble. The victimization of
women seems disproportionate not simply to women's share of the
population but to their desert; the victimization of women seems
particularly unfair. The proper complaint, therefore, is not that
the victimization statistics lack "objectivity," because observa-
tions about women's disproportionate victimization involve an
irreducible normative element. That perceptions about women's
victimization rest in part on socially constructed value judg-
ments does not, of course, render such perceptions invalid or
unimportant.
What the data themselves suggest is that the criminal jus-
tice system's preoccupation with male offenders and male victims
is not exclusively an artifact of cultural bias in reporting
and charging behavior. In part, this preoccupation reflects
the nature of the underlying phenomenon of crime in our soci-
ety and probably most others. Nor would we expect (or want)
progress for women to increase women's participation as offend-
ers or as homicide, robbery, and assault victims.19 So for the
foreseeable future, the raw material of criminal justice is likely
to remain, to an overwhelming extent, disproportionately male in
character.
Under these circumstances women have, until very recently,
remained at the margins of thought about criminaljustice problems.
The criminal justice system has been run by men, against men, and
for the benefit of men. Not so much different from the rest of
society, but more so.
The Sections that follow consider some of what needs
to be done to correct that imbalance in four areas of special
concern to women-domestic violence, rape, sentencing, and
prisons.
19 On the possibility that women's independence and increased workforce partici-
pation might increase women's rates of offending, see infra text accompanying notes
125-29. For a discussion of connections between women's independence and society's
stereotypes of women as criminals, see Susan N. Herman, Thelma and Louise and
Bonnie and Jean: Images of Women as Criminals, 2 S. CAL. REV. L. & WOMEN'S STUD.
53, 62 (1992); Elizabeth V. Spelman & Martha Minow, Outlaw Women: An Essay on
Thelma and Louise, 26 NEw ENG. L. REv. 1281, 1281 (1992).
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II. DOMESTIC VIOLENCE
Lack of attention to domestic violence has a venerable tradition
in the criminal justice system. Failure to prosecute abusive
husbands was not just the result of inattention, because for
centuries, the criminal law gave the husband an affirmative privilege
to beat his wife in order to provide her with what was seen as
appropriate chastisement and instruction." The husband's formal
privilege of chastisement was abolished by the end of the nineteenth
century,21 but wife beating continued. The extent of it cannot be
measured precisely, but even the cautious studies point to high
levels of abuse: 28% of all women experiencing a violent assault at
some point in their marriages; 16% of married women assaulted by
a spouse in a single year.
22
This culture of spousal abuse coexists with a police practice of
not arresting wife beaters, especially in cases perceived as "ordinary"
misdemeanor assaults.21 Many episodes of domestic violence
involve life-threatening attacks, assaults with guns, knives, and other
weapons, or brutal battering that leaves serious physical injuries.
Police are likely to take such cases more seriously than the much
" See Anne M. Coughlin, Excusing Women, 82 CAL. L. REV. 1, 40-41 (1994) (noting
that the husband's right to chastise his wife stemmed from "the belief that married
women suffered from a volitional disability");Joyce E. McConnell, Beyond Metaphor:
Battered Women, Involuntary Servitude and the Thirteenth Amendment, 4 YALE J.L. &
FEMINISM 207, 232 (1992) (noting that "[t]he batterer's belief in a man's right to
chastise his partner and to coerce sexual services remains entrenched in the law").
Blackstone attempted to rationalize the husband's privilege of chastisement by
connectingit to the marital coercion doctrine, under which a husband could be liable
for crimes the wife might commit in his presence (actual or constructive). It was only
fitting, Blackstone argued, that the husband have a corresponding privilege of
chastisement in order to deter his wife from actions that would expose him to
criminal liability. See 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES 432 ("For, as he is to
answer for her misbehaviour, the law thought it reasonable to intrust him with this
power of restraining her, by domestic chastisement, in the same moderation that a
man is allowed to correct his servants or children .... ").
" See, e.g., Fulgham v. State, 46 Ala. 143, 143 (1871) (abolishing a husband's right
to chastise his wife); The Queen v.Jackson, 1 Q.B. 671,681-82 (1891) (abolishing the
right of marital chastisement in England); see also Bernadette D. Sewell, Note, History
of Abuse: Societa4 Judicia, and Legislative Responses to the Problem of Wife Beating, 23
SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 983, 984 (1989) (noting that legal authorization of marital
chastisement "continued to exist in many Western cultures until the late nineteenth
century").
' See Frieze & Browne, supra note 12, at 179.
2 See LAWRENCE W. SHERMAN, POLICING DOMESTIC VIOLENCE: EXPERIMENTS AND
DILEMMAS 26-27 (1992) (describing patterns of underenforcement of domestic
violence laws).
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more numerous domestic disturbances classified as misdemeanors-
those involving loud arguments, slapping, shoving, and kicking.
24
Arrest rates in spousal abuse cases range from a low of only 12% to
a high of no more than 50%.25 Up through the 1970s, police
training materials instructed officers to avoid making an arrest
whenever possible,2 6 and in several states, the majority of police
departments had explicit policies against making arrests in domestic
assault cases.
2 7
Advocates for battered women brought a number of lawsuits
challenging these practices on sex discrimination grounds.28 There
is, however, a problem in trying to attack police practices in this
way: arrest rates are very low in all kinds of assault cases, even
those involving assailants who are strangers to the victim.29 Yet
the woman who is repeatedly abused by her partner probably needs
police protection much more than a man who gets into a fight in a
bar. So lawyers working for battered women shifted their focus
from one of trying to eliminate sex discrimination to one of trying
to eliminate discretion. Mandatory arrest is now the solution
favored by many leading advocates for battered women."0
24 See id. at 26 (noting that police widely ignore domestic violence that involves
only slaps and kicks).
' See Delbert S. Elliott, Criminal Justice Procedures in Family Violence Crimes, in
FAMILY VIOLENCE, supra note 12, at 427, 438.
26 See ROGER LANGLEY & RICHARD C. LEVY, WIFE BEATING: THE SILENT CRISIS
164-65 (1977) (citing the Detroit Police Department's General Orders which imply
that domestic violence is not a crime); Elliott, supra note 25, at 435 (noting that
"[t]here is little question that the. .. 'hands off' view predominated prior to the early
1970s" and that "[p]olice training materials clearly specified that, when responding
to domestic disputes, arrest was to be avoided whenever possible").
2 See Lawrence W. Sherman & Richard A. Berk, TheMinneapolis Domestic Violence
Experiment, POLICE FOUND. REP., Apr. 1984, at 7, 8.
" See e.g., Thurman v. City of Torrington, 595 F. Supp. 1521, 1531 (D. Conn.
1984) (denying the defendant's motion to dismiss a Fourteenth Amendment claim
that police provided less protection to women abused by spouses or boyfriends than
to victims of nondomestic violence); Bruno v. Codd, 396 N.Y.S.2d 974, 979 (Sup. Ct.
1977) (denying a police department's motion for summary judgment on charges of
inadequately protecting women from their abusive husbands), rev'd, 407 N.Y.S.2d 165
(App. Div. 1978) (mem.), and aft'd, 393 N.E.2d 976 (N.Y. 1979); see also Joan Zorza,
The Criminal Law of Misdemeanor Domestic Violence, 1970-1990, 83 J. CRIM. L. &
CRIMINOLOGY 46,53-60 (1992) (documenting the history of sex discrimination in suits
filed against violent husbands).
" See Elliott, supra note 25, at 438-41 (examining the similarity between arrest
rates for assaults committed against family members and for similar violent crimes
perpetuated against strangers).
' See, e.g., Clifford Krauss, Keeping in Touch with the Victims of Domestic Violence,
N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 21, 1994, at B3 (noting victims' advocates' praise for mandatory
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A. Mandatory Arrest Through the Lens of Feminist Jurisprudence
Domestic violence, a central issue in the struggle to assure
dignity and equality for women, is extensively discussed in feminist
literature.-" Yet there has been little effort to consider how battles
over theoretical commitments or attempts to refine theoretical
paradigms might inform efforts to begin solving this critical
problem.
One obvious irony involves the manner in which the tactic
favored by many feminist reformers (mandatory arrest) collides with
the part of feminist theory that advocates open-textured standards
and attention to the nuances of relationships. Feminists inspired by
the work of Carol Gilligan 32 reject inflexible rights as a distinctively
male conception.3 Police officers who do not arrest battering
husbands are not being very "male" in that sense. They are making
ad hoc judgments, based on their intuitions about the whole
situation.
This sort of police discretion is presumably not what Gilligan
really meant by an ethic of care and connection. Nevertheless, the
example highlights a more general point about the supposed clash
between a male ethic of rights and a female ethic of context and
relationship. There is nothing especially feminist about an ad hoc,
discretionary approach to making decisions. It all depends on the
values that inform the exercise of the discretion. Nor should we
automatically count as "feminist" any ethic that emphasizes caring,
connection, and the continuity of relationships. There are situa-
tions where that ethic is not only out of place, but dangerous to
women.34  Everything depends on the particular problem, the
arrest policies instituted in New York City).
For references to the recent literature, see SANFORD H. KADISH & STEPHENJ.
SCHULHOFER, CRIMINAL LAW AND ITS PROCESSEs 829 & n.2 (6th ed. 1995).
32 See, e.g., GILLIGAN, supra note 4.
3 See, e.g., M. Kay Harris, Moving into the New Millennium: Toward a Feminist
Vision ofJustice, PRISONJ., Fall-Winter 1987, at 27,32 ("[In Gilligan's research] [m]en
were more likely to employ a 'rights/justice' orientation [toward moral issues] and
women were more likely to reflect a 'care/response' orientation ... ."); Frances
Heidensohn, Models ofJustice: Portia orPersephone? Some Thoughts on Equality, Fairness
and Gender in the Field of Criminal Justice, 14 INT'L J. Soc. L. 287, 295-96 (1986)
(noting that men become "detached, autonomous and individualized" in their quest
for justice, while women tend to focus on context and caring).
' An "ethic of care" poses related dangers in such criminaljustice contexts as the
juvenile court movement, civil commitment of the mentally ill, and rehabilitative
models of sentencing. See StephenJ. Schulhofer, The Gender Question in Criminal Law,
SOC. PHIL. & POL'Y, Spring 1990, at 105, 124. In particular,
THE FEMINIST CHALLENGE
values presupposed, and the kinds of people who will make the
judgments. As Kathleen Daly observes:
When court officials define crime and impose sanctions, they use
relational reasoning and an ethic of care toward defendants ....
This female voice may not contain the same relational concerns
that women (or feminists) desire, but that is different from saying
that men's form of legal reasoning does not contain relational,
caretaking, or responsibility concerns. Thus, the problem in
criminal-court practices is not that the female voice is absent, but
that certain relations are presupposed, maintained, and
reproduced. 5
Scholars associated with what is often called "radical feminism"
approach this problem from the opposite direction. They argue
that women should have an absolute right to bodily integrity and
protection from aggression."6 Formal equality (a "liberal feminist"
stance) is a poor benchmark here because men involved in fights
and minor assaults do not have the same need for state protection
from one another that women have for protection from assaultive
men. Thus, even if the police are equally inattentive to acquain-
tance assaults when victims are men or women, the state's seemingly
even-handed inaction is nonetheless an affirmative policy that
contributes to the subordination of women."7  For feminists
committed to this view, society has an obligation to use arrest
powers vigorously when a man violates a woman's right to physical
safety.3" This is a coherent perspective, and surely an appealing
the model of caring and connection [is flawed] because ... conflicting
interests are inherent in any criminal justice system that serves society's
interests in deterrence and social protection. A system of criminal law
premised on caring and connection will simply mask conflict and invite the
abuses that vague standards of intervention have produced over and over
in ostensibly benign programs.
Id. (citation omitted).
" Kathleen Daly, CriminalJustice Ideologies and Practices in Different Voices: Some
Feminist Questions About Justice, 17 INT'LJ. Soc. L. 1. 2 (1989).
m See, e.g., MACKINNON, supra note 3, at 41 (noting that in domestic relationships,
battery of women tends to be ignored, whereas "[w]hen [men] are hit, a person has
been assaulted").
17 See id. at 76 (arguing that when government refuses to prosecute for marital
rape, "the woman's obligation to deliver sexually is effectively enforced by the state").
' See Kathleen Waits, The Criminal Justice System's Response to Battering:
Understanding the Problem, Forging the Solutions, in FEMINIST JURISPRUDENCE 188, 202
(PatriciaSmith ed., 1993) (arguing that "[a]rrest of the batterer is the central element
of an effective police response"); Zorza, supra note 28, at 66 (arguing that in order
to deter batterers effectively, more severe sanctions should be imposed).
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one, but it takes no account of the psychological, social, and
institutional dynamics that determine whether, and under what
conditions, a "get tough" approach will really help a particular
victim or women in general.
B. Evaluating Mandatory Arrest
Good policy for domestic violence cases depends less on the
theoretical appeal of either "absolute rights" or "relational reason-
ing" than on the actual effect of laws and policies that translate
these conceptions into operational strategies. In Minneapolis,
police conducted an experiment to determine the effect of arrest in
misdemeanor assault cases. 9 The result was dramatic support for
mandatory arrest: by every measure, arrest was reported to be more
effective than other responses such as counseling the parties or
sending the suspect away.4 The results were widely reported and
enthusiastically received; numerous police departments adopted
rules requiring arrest in domestic assault cases, and more than a
dozen states enacted statutes mandating that approach statewide.
41
By 1989, only five years after the study results were released, 84%
of urban police agencies reported having mandatory or preferred
arrest policies for domestic violence cases.
4 2
Unfortunately, the rapid and uncritical acceptance of the
Minneapolis findings was premature because flaws in the study
made it hard to be sure that reported deterrent effects of arrest
were not spurious.43 To afford a more complete picture, experi-
9 See Lawrence W. Sherman & Richard A. Berk, The Specific Deterrent Effects of
Arrest for Domestic Assault, 49 AM. Soc. REv. 261, 262 (1984) (reporting the results of
the Minneapolis study).
0 See Sherman & Berk, supra note 27, at 7. For an example of early warnings
about possible flaws in the Minneapolis study and the need for caution in interpreting
its findings, see Elliott, supra note 25, at 453-54.
41 See Lawrence W. Sherman & Ellen G. Cohn, The Impact of Research on Legal
Policy: The Minneapolis Domestic Violence Experiment, 23 L. & Soc'Y REv. 117, 129
(1989) (noting that "[t]he publicity about the Minneapolis experiment did reach a
large number of police departments and may have had a substantial ... influence on
policy"); Zorza, supra note 28, at 64-65 nn.182-86 (citing to the applicable state
statutes).
" See Lawrence W. Sherman, The Influence of Criminology on Criminal Law:
Evaluating Arrestsfor Misdemeanor Domestic Violence, 83J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1,
23-24 (1992).
4s Some of the deterrence effects were inferred from official arrest records, but
such records cannot reveal whether arrest is deterring subsequent violence or only
subsequent reports. The Minneapolis study attempted to control for this problem
through follow-up interviews with victims, but there was a large falloff in victim
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ments testing the effects of mandatory arrest were repeated, among
broader demographic groups and with better data-collection
procedures, in five other cities."' In three of them, arrest had a
greater deterrent effect than other responses only in the short run;
the effect tended to diminish over time, and within a year after the
initial intervention, suspects who had been arrested were more likely
to engage in repeat violence than those who had merely been
warned.45 A reanalysis of the Minneapolis data revealed a similar
pattern in that city.4" Over time, in other words, arrest often
seems to have an "escalation effect," aggravating the subsequent
violence.
Advocates for battered women have attacked these more recent
studies, especially the "do nothing" strategy they seem to sup-
port. As one attorney writes, "We do not consider eliminating
arrest for... [robbery], [just] because it may not deter a particu-
lar... class of individuals."4" Unfortunately, that is a danger-
ous answer. The objective here is to protect battered women. If
arrest is not doing that, we need to consider using other solu-
tions, either in conjunction with arrest or as an alternative to it.
Moreover, the danger is not just that arrest may not deter, but that
in some situations, arrest may make matters worse. Mandatory
arrest may cause more violence to the very women we are trying to
help.
Other unintended harms to women have emerged as well. In
mandatory arrest jurisdictions, police are sometimes obliged to
arrest the abused woman because her partner alleges that she had hit
participation in the follow-ups, and the follow-up study was limited to only six
months, a period when temporary deterrence effects may dominate to the extent that
court proceedings remain possible. See Elliott, supra note 25, at 453 (noting that only
49% of the victims in the Minneapolis study completed all 12 follow-up interviews).
44 See SHERMAN, supra note 23, at 15-18 (reporting results from similar experi-
ments conducted in Omaha, Charlotte, Milwaukee, Colorado Springs, and Miami).
45 See id. at 17, 188-87 (describing an initial deterrent effect of arrest, followed by
a subsequent escalation in the likelihood of repeat violence in Omaha, Charlotte, and
Milwaukee).
46 In Minneapolis, the deterrent effects of arrest (measured by victim interviews)
decayed over time and disappeared after six months. See id. at 197. Although the
Minneapolis study did not collect victim interview data after six months, the trend of
the data suggests the possibility of an escalation effect after the six-month point.
(When repeat violence was measured by official arrest records, arrest had a clear
deterrent effect that continued for the entire 18-month period studied. See id. But
official records may present a misleading picture of the actual level of battering, if
arrest deters victims from reporting subsequent incidents to the police.)
47 Zorza, supra note 28, at 66.
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him.48 And there is some indication that visible, highly popular
mandatory arrest programs have permitted legislators to reduce
their support for more costly solutions like shelters for battered
women.
49
Surprisingly, the tentative Minneapolis study and its recommen-
dations for a more punitive approach received widespread attention
and an immediately favorable reception, but public officials and the
media have either attacked or ignored the more thorough studies
that suggest the opposite conclusion." Theoretical and ideological
commitments to punitive strategies and to a rights-oriented
response to aggression seem to dominate any concern for designing
operational programs which actually help abused women. Yet the
best available evidence suggests that an across-the-board policy of
mandatory arrest should be anathema to feminists. As Lawrence
Sherman writes, using mandatory arrest to fight domestic violence
"may make as much sense as fighting fire with gasoline." 51
C. Selective Mandatory Arrest?
An important qualification to this pessimistic assessment of
mandatory arrest emerges when data from the follow-up studies are
disaggregated. The escalation effect seems especially strong when
the batterer is unemployed, but arrest does appear to have a net
deterrent effect when the husband has ajob or other marks of social
stability.5 2  That finding triggers a further series of dilemmas.
Should we arrest only the employed? If not, should we arrest in all
cases, knowing that this will harm some women? A third possibility
is to leave the decision to each officer on the spot. That would
probably give us the worst of both worlds: police would arrest
blacks and the underclass while letting off middle-class white
48 In Connecticut, mandatory arrest policies reportedly led to the arrest of both
spouses in 14% of the cases. See Jan Hoffman, When Men Hit Women, N.Y. TIMEs,
Feb. 16, 1992, (Magazine), at 23,26. Moreover, if children are present and no other
caretaker for them is available, the children may have to be placed in state custody
until one of the parents is released. See id.
49 See SHERMAN, supra note 23, at 255.
'o See id. at 135-36 (describing political attacks on empirical research and the
unwillingness of the Wisconsin legislature to repeal its mandatory arrest statute after
the Milwaukee study had indicated the harmful effects of that policy); id. at 266
(describing sparse press coverage of the Milwaukee findings); Sherman & Cohn, supra
note 41, at 129 (stating that publicity about the Minneapolis study reached a large
number of police departments and had a substantial influence on policy).
51 SHERMAN, supra note 23, at 210.
52 See id. at 155.
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offenders with a warning.5 s In practice we would get warnings
when arrest might really help and arrest when it is most likely to be
counterproductive.
A final possibility is to leave the choice up to the victim." This
seems a promising option, but it too conceals dilemmas and risks.
Victims know the offender better than the police do and may be
able to predict whether his arrest will be an effective deterrent.
Deference to the victim's wishes also may strengthen her self-esteem
and empower her within the relationship. Yet there are important
countervailing concerns. Few victims will be aware of the long-run
escalation effects of arrest or of the complex roots of that phenome-
non. Moreover, the victim will have to make her decision at a
moment of great stress with little relevant information and little
time for reflection.5 Even if the police talk privately to the victim
in a separate room, the offender may perceive that her preferences
control the arrest decision, and if so, the escalation effects of arrest
could be aggravated. Deference to the victim could backfire in
another way if victims who fear retaliation are deterred from
expressing their preference for arrest.
The effects of deferring to the victim's preferences are worth
studying carefully, but there is little reason to hope that such a
policy will offer a panacea for the dilemmas we have been consider-
ing. In any case, to underscore the obvious, theoretical conceptions
of domination and related commitments to "empowering the
victim "" provide little practical guidance to those who want to find
a way to help women caught in abusive relationships. The value of
deference to victim preferences turns on the specific methods used
to make that policy operational and on the complex, multidirec-
tional effects that those methods will have in practice.
53 See, e.g., Caroline Forell, Stopping the Violence: Mandatory Arrest and Police Tort
LiabilityforFailure to Assist Battered Women, 6 BERKELEY WOMEN's L.J. 215,221 (1991)
(summarizing results of a Duluth study in which minority males comprised 8.5% of
those arrested under a policy of mandatory arrest, but comprised 33% of arrestees
when the decision to arrest was left to police officers' discretion).
"' See, e.g., David A. Ford, Prosecution as a Victim Power Resource: A Note on
Empowering Women in Violent Conjugal Relationships, 25 L. & Soc'y REv. 313, 330
(1991) (evaluating deference to victim preferences in deciding whether to arrest and
prosecute batterers).
I To make matters worse, a significant number of domestic violence victims (21%
in one city studied) are intoxicated at the time police arrive on the scene. See
SHERMAN, supra note 23, at 207.
-1 See Ford, supra note 54, at 317-20 (discussing empowerment theories).
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D. Getting Tougher: Giving Content to "Arrest"
Instead of seeking to minimize arrest, especially for unemployed
husbands, a more promising approach might be to consider more
severe sanctions for all categories of offenders. Indeed, mandatory
arrest may appear ineffective or dangerous in part because the
response being advocated ("arrest") is mainly a slogan, not a fully
specified policy. In many cities, suspects arrested on domestic
violence charges are free within a few hours; among the six cities in
which mandatory arrest experiments were conducted, average times
in custody varied from twenty-four hours to only two.5"
The constitutional right to bail" accounts for some of the rapid
release times and may make that feature of the current landscape
difficult to change. Nonetheless, rapid release times probably are
not a major cause of the ineffectiveness of mandatory arrest,
because most of the experiments show some deterrence over the
short run, even when suspects spent very little time in jail.59 The
problem is that the deterrence effect of arrest tends to dissipate,
and escalation effects begin to dominate, roughly six months after
the arrest.6" The decay of deterrence effects could be slowed by
making the initial arrest a more unpleasant experience, but that
approach obviously risks making the escalation effects more severe
as well.
There is another reason why mandatory arrest is primarily a
slogan, not a concrete policy. To advocate "arrest" says nothing
about what should happen after the arrestee's inevitable release on
recognizance or money bail. Husbands arrested for misdemeanor
assault are almost never prosecuted.6 ' An obvious option is to
combine the increased use of arrest with a greater determination to
get convictions and jail time. But the available data permit little
confidence that prosecution provides the easy answer. In Milwau-
kee and Charlotte, two cities in which mandatory arrest appeared to
produce an escalation effect, the percentage of suspects prosecuted
57 See SHERMAN, supra note 23, at 140-42. Longer times in custody did not
correlate cleanly with either the deterrence effects or the escalation effects, perhaps
because times were poorly measured, and other factors that affect the severity of the
arrest experience (jail conditions, for example) were not measured at all. See id.
" See U.S. CONST. amend. VIII.
59 See SHERMAN, supra note 23, at 129, 141.
60 See id. at 189.
6" See Sherman, supra note 42, at 29 (reporting that in Minneapolis, only 4% of
those arrested were ever convicted, and in Milwaukee, only 1% were ever convicted).
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and convicted was only 1% and 28% respectively. 2 But substantial
escalation effects also occurred in Omaha, a city where 64% of the
arrestees were prosecuted and convicted.6"
Normatively, as well, the increased-prosecution approach poses
uncomfortable choices. Since employed offenders seem to be
deterred by arrest alone,' do we reserve prosecution and jail time
for the unemployed? That's not easy to live with. Or do we jail all
the offenders? If so, the men who had jobs often will lose them,
and middle-class wives who have sought help in the past may now
be afraid to call the police. And no matter which way we resolve
these issues, we still cannot be sure that a more punitive approach
will have a net deterrent effect overall. For the chronic, seriously
violent batterer, vigorous prosecution and substantial prison time
are usually appropriate. But unless we are willing to treat every
episode of domestic assault as a felony deserving a year or more in
prison, the deterrent and incapacitative effects of punishment, in
cases not involving a weapon or serious bodily injury, are inherently
limited.
E. Other Alternatives
Because mandatory arrest and other punitive responses have
such problematic effects, other options need to be explored. Yet
the array of promising alternatives is meager.
One seemingly constructive approach is for the officer on the
scene to refer the abuser to counseling services, possibly with the
added inducement of a court order or a threat to arrest after any
repeat episode. Unfortunately, evaluations of this option are just as
pessimistic as those concerning the use of arrest. There is as yet no
evidence that counseling reduces the offender's propensity for
repeat violence. 5 What is worse, because women are more likely
to remain with an abuser who is in counseling, the likelihood of
further victimization actually increases when the counseling option
is used.66 Thus, counseling, like mandatory arrest, actually seems
62See SHERMAN, supra note 23, at 141-42.
s See id.; Franklyn W. Dunford et al., The Role of Arrest in Domestic Assault: The
Omaha Police Experiment, 28 CRIMINOLOGY 183, 193 (1990).
" See supra text accompanying note 52.
6 See SHERMAN, supra note 23, at 249 (noting that "no randomized experiment yet
demonstrat[es] that court-ordered counseling can reduce the frequency or prevalence
of repeat domestic violence"); Zorza, supra note 28, at 67 (noting that "completing
batterer treatment made no difference in stopping future violence").
6See Zorza, supra note 28, at 67 (suggesting that victims may be "deceived" into
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associated with an escalation effect. Such findings obviously do not
mean that counseling cannot be helpful. Outcomes may depend on
the structure and quality of the counseling programs, the kinds of
offenders who participate in them, the degree to which participation
is coerced, and so on. Well-conceived programs certainly deserve
to be funded, tried, and tested, but until that can be done, the
counseling option needs to be viewed with caution.
Orders of protection can backfire in a similar way. As a popular
component of domestic violence reform legislation, orders of
protection have proved notoriously ineffective, largely because
statutory mandates and newly created rights have not been
accompanied by commensurate efforts to provide necessary
resources or to educate police, court officials, and victims in the
proper use of new procedures.67 As a result, such orders may
serve only to foster misplaced confidence that ultimately leaves
victims at greater risk.6' Except in the case of the most deter-
mined aggressors, orders of protection probably can contribute to
the protection of abused women, provided they are backed by
thorough training and better resources. In the absence of substan-
tial and sustained institutional support, however, they risk causing
more harm than good.
Another important approach is to expand the availability of
shelters for battered women, so that victims can more easily leave
abusive relationships. Police called to the scene of a domestic
assault could be required to explain that option and to offer to
transport the victim directly to a shelter if she wishes. Lawrence
Sherman suggests this approach as a possible way for police to
protect the victim against both the long-run escalation effects of
arresting the abuser and the short-run dangers of leaving the scene
without arresting him.
6 9
Theoretical commitments and intuitions of fairness prompt
resistance to this approach, however. Why should the victim be the
reconciling with abusers in counseling because the victims may think that counseling
will produce an end to the violent behavior).
67 A study by the National Institute ofJustice found that police often fail to inform
victims of available remedies, fail to serve the orders of protection on the abuser
(thus nullifying their effect), and fail to arrest when orders of protection are violated.
See Peter Finn, Civil Protection Orders: A Flawed Opportunity forInteroention, in WOMAN
BA=TERING: POLICY RESPONSES 155, 182 (Michael Steinman ed., 1991).
" SeeJanice Grau et al., Restraining Orders for Battered Women: Issues of Access and
Efficacy, WOMEN & POL., Fall 1984, at 13, 27 (calling for improvement of the
procedures for obtaining, and enforcing, restraining orders).
69 See SHERMAN, supra note 23, at 208-10.
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one who has to leave her home? Why not require the abuser to
leave? Of course, the victim still can reject the offer; she could not
be required to leave. But when a police officer refuses to arrest the
abuser and encourages the victim to accept transportation to a
shelter, we can hardly view state policy as simply facilitating the
exercise of a wholly "voluntary" choice.
The Minneapolis experiment tested the option of requiring the
abuser to leave the premises (ostensibly for eight hours) without
arresting him.7" In reality, however, the abuser was free to return
as soon as the police left. Only arrest or an order of protection will
keep the abuser out of the home, but these responses can be
ineffective and dangerous, as we have seen. In any case, the
Minneapolis experiment showed that requiring the abuser merely to
leave produced high rates of repeat violence.71  Against that
background, the fact that the victim has a right to remain on the
premises, while the abuser has none, can be dispositive only as a
matter of pure theory. When a terrorist is spraying the street with
bullets, those of us who have the right to remain on the sidewalk
may prefer not to stand our ground. In an imperfect world,
discretion may be the better part of valor. And the world of efforts
to control domestic violence is hedged by imperfections at every
turn.
F. Developing Effective Responses
The preceding considerations suggest that sharply etched,
theoretically satisfying positions are unlikely to carry us very far
toward effective solutions to the problem of domestic violence.
Helpful responses are more likely to be complex, eclectic, costly,
and elusive.
Several components of a constructive policy nonetheless can be
identified. First, complex and contingent response strategies must
not obscure the message that spousal abuse is a crime and that it will
not be tolerated. Every police response must be structured to send
the offender a clear warning that domestic violence is unacceptable
and that future incidents will be met with increasingly punitive
responses. Similarly, to combat any police tendency to take domes-
tic violence cases cavalierly, officers need guidelines that require an
energetic response. Mandatory arrest serves that function but only
70 See Sherman & Berk, supra note 27, at 7, 9.
71 See id. at 7, 12.
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at some risk to the women we are trying to help. A more useful
rule of thumb, therefore, would not insist on arrest per se, but
mandatory action-action of some sort, from a list of strong,
constructive alternatives,7 2 and a mandatory report (normally in
writing), both to ensure a thoughtful response and to inform
officers who might be called to the same address in the future.
Specific response options will necessarily reflect the services and
programs (including prosecution programs) available in the
particular jurisdiction; over the longer run, effort should focus on
strengthening and evaluating alternative approaches. For chronic
offenders and cases involving serious injuries, a vigorous prosecu-
tion program should assure substantial jail or prison terms. In the
most minor cases, a stern warning or a reference to counseling may
be appropriate, especially if records are adequate to assure that
there have been no prior episodes of violence involving the same
couple. For cases falling in between these extremes, arrest or some
other means of separating the parties should be considered, with
choices depending on the woman's desire to preserve the relation-
ship, the history of past abuse, and other relevant circumstances.
Where resources and back-up procedures permit, it may be
appropriate to require the husband to leave and stay away long
enough for the wife to obtain an effective order of protection. But
if that avenue seems unlikely to afford real safety for the woman, an
offer to transport her to a shelter may be appropriate, if that is the
course she prefers.
The spousal-abuse problem illustrates two general points that
apply to criminal justice and to probably most other areas of the
legal system. First, legal, social, and institutional details are critical.
Second, quick-fix statutes and doctrinal change do very little, and
may even backfire, unless they are backed by changes in attitudes,
personnel, and resources.
III. RAPE
I have just suggested that rigid rules will not work well in
domestic violence cases. There, we need to rely on flexible
standards. For rape statutes, I reach the opposite conclusion.
7 See SHERMAN, supra note 23, at 253-56 (listing options including transporting the
victim to a shelter, taking the suspect or victim to a detoxification treatment center,
and allowing the victim to decide if an immediate arrest should be made).
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At one time, the law of rape openly denied equality to women,
for example, in rules that required special corroboration for rape
complaints."3 Formal inequalities have largely disappeared, but the
problems have not. Most of the problems stem from the highly
contextual way that the formally equal doctrines of rape law are
applied in practice. As in the case of arrests for domestic violence,
the law is quite preoccupied with the nuances of the relationship
between the alleged offender and the victim. What is missing is not
ajurisprudence of context. What is missing is sufficient respect for
what should be clear-cut rights.
Because the current feminist critiques are by now familiar, I will
sketch the problems and the prevalent criticisms rather quickly.
Then I will suggest a perspective that is a bit different from the ones
most often discussed.
A. The Prevailing Law of Rape
The controversies are framed by a definition of rape that has
been with us since the time of Blackstone-intercourse by force and
without consent.74 There have been two important waves of
statutory reforms, the Model Penal Code revision in the 1950s and
revisions inspired by feminist reformers in the 1970s. 75  New
statutes relaxed the rules of evidence and tinkered with the
definitions of force and consent. But all of the statutes accepted
the basic framework, which still requires both force and
nonconsent.
76
" See, e.g., United States v. Wiley, 492 F.2d 547, 550-51 (D.C. Cir. 1973)
(establishing that a person may not be convicted of a "sex offense" unless the
testimony of the victim is corroborated by, for example, medical evidence); see also
Note, The Rape Corroboration Requirement: Repeal Not Reform, 81 YALE L.J. 1365, 1366-
72 (1972) (recounting the history and status of the corroboration requirement). Wiley
was overruled by United States v. Sheppard, 569 F.2d 114, 117 (D.C. Cir. 1977)
(holding that corroboration of the victim's testimony is no longer a requirement for
conviction in a sex offense case). Nearly all American jurisdictions have abandoned
special corroboration rules applicable only to rape complaints. See KADISH &
SCHULHOFER, supra note 31, at 371 (noting that no American state now requires
corroboration in forcible rape cases).
74 See 4 WILLAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES 210 (defining rape as "carnal
knowledge of a woman forcibly and against her will").
' For a discussion of the background and specific elements of the reforms of the
1950s and the 1970s, see Stephen J. Schulhofer, Taking Sexual Autonomy Seriously:
Rape Law and Beyond, 11 L. & PHIL. 35, 36-40 (1992).76 See id. at 38-39.
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The reforms of the 1970s made convictions somewhat easier, but
important kinds of abuse still are not covered by statutory language.
Two examples from recent cases will serve to illustrate my points.
1. The defendant meets the victim in a singles bar, and she
gives him a ride home. When they get there, she turns down his
invitation to come inside, but he is not about to take "no" for an
answer. He takes her car keys from the ignition and pleads with her
to come in for a few minutes. It is 1:00 a.m., in an unfamiliar
neighborhood, and she is frightened, so she goes with him under
protest. In his room, he presses her for sex. She keeps saying "no"
and starts to cry, but she eventually submits so that he will let her
leave.
77
The appellate court said it would uphold the rape conviction in
this case, but only because there was evidence that the defendant
had threatened the victim with direct physical harm. Why should
that detail be critical to the result?
2. The defendant and the victim live together for several
months. He often beats her to make her meet his sexual demands.
Eventually, she moves out, but one day they meet again and go to
a friend's house to talk. The defendant bluntly announces that he
wants sex, but she refuses. He orders her to lie down on a bed.
She freezes in fear, while he undresses her and penetrates her.
7 9
Should that kind of behavior be sufficient to make out a case of
rape? The North Carolina Supreme Court said the evidence of
nonconsent was overwhelming. But it also said there was no proof
that the defendant had used force. So it reversed the conviction.
8 0
These are situations where the defendant's behavior is egre-
giously wrong, by any standard of common decency. But existing
conceptions of force and nonconsent are not clear enough to make
the conduct illegal.
B. Strategies for Reform
Most reformers responding to problems such as those described
above make essentially two points: 1) "no" means no,81 and
2) force should extend from explicit to implicit threats, from
7 See State v. Rusk, 424 A.2d 720 (Md. 1981).
78 See id. at 728.
71 See State v. Alston, 312 S.E.2d 470 (N.C. 1984).
80 See id. at 475-76.
81 See, e.g., ESTRICH, supra note 7, at 102 (maintaining that the law should define
"consent" in such a way that "no" means no).
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violence to implicit power.8 2 These points are plausible, and they
are certainly widely accepted. But on close inspection, these
solutions turn out to be misdirected.
1. "No" Means No
It is hard to see why the claim that "no" means no should be
considered a revolutionary idea, but many people are still hotly
debating it. In a recent article, Professors Husak and Thomas
marshalled social science surveys in which many women say that, for
them, "no" does not mean no.13 The authors conclude that contem-
porary American culture does not give a verbal "no" the meaning of
unequivocal nonconsent that I and others have attributed to it.
They write that "Schulhofer's proposal [to treat a verbal "no" as
sufficient to establish nonconsent] is not without cost to women
[because] it distorts rather than accurately represents [existing
social] convention[s] .. 8. .84
These objections to treating "no" as unequivocal evidence of
nonconsent reflect conceptual, as well as political, disagreement.
"No" means no is in part a cultural claim and an advocacy slogan;
as such it invites skeptics to question what "no" really does mean.
The usual feminist response to such skeptics has been to reassert
forcefully that "no" does mean no and that any non-Neanderthal
male should agree. 5 It is not surprising that feminists would be
reluctant to concede that "no" might ever mean yes (apart from
cases of abject false consciousness). Yet much of this debate results
from misunderstanding the significance of empirical data for what
is ultimately not an empirical issue. For law, the relevant question
' See e.g., Susan Estrich, Rape, 95 YALE LJ. 1087,1115 (1986) (arguing that courts
should "understand force as the power one need not use (at least physically)").
' See Douglas N. Husak & George C. Thomas III, Date Rape, Social Convention, and
Reasonable Mistakes, 11 L. & PHIL. 95, 122 (1992). In a recent survey of Texas female
undergraduates, 39.3% reported that they had said "no" when they meant yes, and
60.8% of the sexually experienced women in the survey said that they had done so.
See Charlene L. Muehlenhard & Lisa C. Hollabaugh, Do Women Sometimes Say No When
They Mean Yes? The Prevalence and Correlates of Women's Token Resistance to Sex, 54 J.
PERSONALITY & Soc. PSYCHOL. 872, 874 (1988). The authors are quick to point out
that this pattern of communication, although rational for some women, can teach
men to disregard women's refusals and thereby increase the incidence of rape. See
id. at 878.
" Husak & Thomas, supra note 83, at 113.
8s See, e.g., CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, TOWARD A FEMINIST THEORY OF THE STATE
175 (1989) ("If rape laws existed to enforce women's control over access to their
sexuality,... no would mean no .... ").
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is the effect that should be attributed to a woman's use of the word
"no."
Although not decisive, the empirical landscape is obviously
relevant here, because in an inquiry about what people mean when
they speak, no one would want to give a word a meaning for legal
purposes that is utterly at odds with ordinary usage. But the matter
becomes a legal issue precisely because the usage of the word is not
uniform throughout the culture. It can hardly be fatal to the
feminist position, therefore, to discover that women who say "no"
do not always mean the same thing. Because they do not, mistakes
are possible. And so long as neither law nor culture develops rules
to permit uniform appraisal of such mistakes, some of them can
plausibly be described (although this will pain many feminists) as
reasonable. The proposition that, for legal purposes, "no" means
no is, therefore, primarily a normative claim about how the word
should be understood in the face of ambiguity about its actual
meaning in any given context.
The objection that taking "no" to mean no will make it "harder
for some women to get what they want" 6 therefore misses the
point of such a proposal. As with any default rule, the legal
proposition that "no" means no does not claim infallible accuracy;
to the contrary, the absence of empirical consensus is its raison
d'etre. It presupposes ambiguity and seeks to allocate the risk of
the inevitable misunderstandings.
As a normative claim, the proposition that "no" should be taken
to mean no is not subject to any plausible objection. True, as
Husak and Thomas note, this "proposal designed to make it more
difficult for men to get away with rape might have the.., effect of
making it harder for some women to get what they want."" But
this cost, inevitable for any default rule, is in no way comparable to
the costs that are incurred by the traditional approach that Husak
and Thomas, among others, prefer. That approach makes it harder
for other women to get what they want, in this case women who have
sought to avoid male sexual impositions by expressing their desires
in plain language. There can be little doubt about which set of
frustrated expectations is more serious or more deserving of legal
protection.
Husak & Thomas, supra note 83, at 114.87 Id.
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Although the "no"-means-no claim should not be controversial,
the more serious difficulty is that this proposition offers surprisingly
little help. In real cases, the "no" is often followed by some form of
equivocal acquiescence, or even a "yes." How should the "no"-
means-no rule apply in cases like that?
One approach suggested is to use something like the Miranda
rule. In police interrogation, a consent to talk about a crime is
considered involuntary if an initial "no" is followed by any questions
or comments that persuade the person to talk.88 The argument is
that a similar approach should apply in rape cases: a woman's
consent would be invalid if her "no" was followed by cajolery or
psychological ploys that led her to acquiesce.
8 9
That approach sounds plausible until you try to apply it to
situations involving dates or acquaintances. Suppose a woman says
"no" to her lover before dinner and then changes her mind after
several hours of intimate conversation? Would the consent have to
be considered invalid? That cannot be the right result. The only
way to sort out these problems is to focus on the conduct that leads
to a "yes"-in other words, whether the persuasions are improper.
"No" means no just does not help sort out whether the things that
happen after the "no" are legitimate or abusive. And even if the
"no" is clear and persistent, the "no"-means-no rule is still insuffi-
cient because it only serves to establish nonconsent, and under
existing law nonconsent is insufficient to establish rape: the
prosecution must prove "force" in addition.
9 0
2. The Meaning of "Force"
The other strand in current reform proposals is to tackle the
problem by expanding the conception of force. Many rape
reformers stress that force can take the form of strength that a man
does not need to use.91 Force can involve not only physical
violence but also other kinds of power.9 2 This approach reflects
the theories of male dominance developed by Catharine MacKin-
' See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 473-74 (1966).
8 See ESTRICH, supra note 7, at 40-41 (contrasting the rule that "no" is insufficient
to establish nonconsent in rape to the rule in custodial questioning that "a suspect's
'no' must mean no, and questioning must cease").
' See supra text accompanying note 76.
91 See Estrich, supra note 82, at 1115.
" See id. (noting that existing law "create[s] a gulf between power and force").
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non95 that are now supported by many moderate feminists" and
by several courts. 5
Some women worry that the dominance approach, which is
intended to strengthen women, may wind up making them feel weak
and more vulnerable.9" The cultural effect of these debates is
tricky, but it is not really decisive for the criminal law. The sexual
pressure on women is real; the law cannot wish that away or wait
until all men "get it."
The more important concern for law is that recognizing the
power of male sexual pressure does not solve the legal problem
because, as usual, a major part of the legal problem is a boundary
("line-drawing") problem. Despite the undoubted value of legal
analysis or cultural criticism that points to commonalities between
physical violence and social, economic, or psychological pressure,
97
the job of legal scholarship is not finished until a workable bound-
ary between permitted and regulated conduct has been identi-
fied. And in the case of rape, the boundary problem is acute. If
93 See MACKINNON, supra note 3, at 40 (arguing that "[glender is ... a question
of power, specifically of male supremacy and female subordination").
9 See, e.g., ESTRICH, supra note 7, at 63 (arguing that one of the problems with
"'force' as a standard is ... that it is too narrowly defined").
9 See, e.g., State ex rel. M.T.S., 609 A.2d 1266, 1277 (N.J. 1992) (stating that the
requirement of "physical force" is satisfied any time the defendant penetrates a
woman against her will); State v. Etheridge, 352 S.E.2d 673, 680 (N.C. 1987) (holding
that "force" may be "actual, physical force or... constructive force in the form of
fear, fright, or coercion").
' See, e.g., Vivian Berger, Not So Simple Rape, CRIM.JUST. ETHICS, Winter-Spring
1988, at 69, 75 (reviewing ESTRICH, supra note 7) (arguing that Estrich's approach
may lead the law to "patronize" women). A related theme is sounded and expanded
in a number of recent revisionist attacks on the feminist program. See, e.g., KATIE
ROIPHE, THE MORNING AFTER: SEX, FEAR, AND FEMINISM ON CAMPUS 163 (1993)
(arguing that teaching women to "recognize" behavior as sexual harassment may train
them to think like victims).
9
1
7 See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Mlinarich, 498 A.2d 395, 416 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1985)
(Spaeth, J., dissenting) (arguing that "forcible compulsion" includes nonphysical
compulsion); see also Lucy R. Harris, Comment, Towards a Consent Standard in the Law
of Rape, 43 U. CHI. L. REv. 613, 643-45 (1976) (arguing for the criminalization of
sexual coercion via threat of nonphysical harm).
" Cf. Robin L. West, Legitimating the Illegitimate: A Comment on Beyond Rape, 93
COLUM. L. REv. 1442 (1993). Professor West's article criticizes a male scholar's
proposal to draw lines between permissible and impermissible sexual pressures, and
suggests that the very effort to mark such a boundary and to condone conduct on one
side of the line is in itself inappropriate. See id. at 1452-59. The article is filled with
interesting and insightful cultural criticism, but its implication that such line-drawing
efforts are inappropriate in principle seems unfair not only to the author of the
proposal, but to the women who are seeking helpful responses to inadequacies in the
law of rape.
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disparities in economic and social power are sufficient to establish
coercion, then force is pervasive in human affairs. If disparity of
size, strength, and fighting ability are sufficient to establish force,
rape is implicit in nearly every heterosexual relationship.
The move to expand the conception of force thus has much
truth to it but no stopping point. In that sense, it is too radical.
That is a common reaction to Professor MacKinnon's approach.99
But the dominance approach is also too conservative because it
remains linked to notions of force. In actual administration, it is
almost certain to be held back by the cultural preconceptions that
determine what force means to the many police, prosecutors,
judges, and jurors who are not feminists. Efforts to expand
accepted conceptions of force can offer interest and excitement to
conversations within feminist circles, but as these approaches rest
upon accordion-like notions of power or pressure, they inevitably
lead the discussion into an area where boundaries will be unclear
and social consensus will be elusive.
We all face pressures and constraints on our choices every day.
The pressing problem for feminist jurisprudence and legal reform
is to provide tools for determining which pressures are excessive or
improper. A "dominance" analysis offers little guidance here,
unless we want to treat conduct as rape whenever the pressures
deployed are deemed "excessive," "unreasonable," or "unfair." A
recent Pennsylvania decision takes essentially that view in equating
the "forcible compulsion" required for rape with "using superior
force-physical, moral, psychological or intellectual-to compel a
person to do a thing against that person's volition." 00 But even
if we by-pass the obvious vagueness problems entailed in deploying
such a standard against economic inducements, emotional pressure,
and the like, this approach will not necessarily work well for the
women we want to protect, because there is no guarantee that
prosecutors and juries will accept a feminist perspective on when
such pressures are improper.
" See, e.g., Berger, supra note 96, at 75 (arguing that "[t]o treat as victims in a legal
sense all of the female victims of life is at some point to cheapen, not celebrate the
rights to self-determination [and] sexual autonomy.., of women").
" Commonwealth v. Rhodes, 510 A.2d 1217, 1225 (Pa. 1986); see also Mlinarich,
498 A.2d at 404 (Spaeth, J., dissenting) (defining "forcible compulsion" to mean to
constrain or compel "by physical, moral, or intellectual means or by the exigencies
of the circumstances"); cf. MODEL PENAL CODE § 213.1(2)(a) (1980) (punishing
conduct as "gross sexual imposition" if it produces submission to intercourse by "any
threat that would prevent resistance by a woman of ordinary resolution").
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Three recent proposals attempt to draw more specific lines.
Professor Donald Dripps argues that physical violence should not be
the only factor sufficient to render sexual intercourse criminal, and
he proposes a crime of "sexual expropriation" to punish certain
nonviolent impositions as an offense distinct from rape. 10 His
analysis rests on a "commodity theory" that sees "sexual cooperation
as a service much like any other," in which "erotic assets" are
exchanged for monetary or nonmonetary compensation.'"
This concededly "unromantic notion of sex" 08 provides a poor
basis for understanding the dynamics of personal relationships, and
it tends to entrench and endorse much of the sexual pressure that
women so often experience as problematic. Although Dripps seems
to acknowledge that "some nonviolent pressures should be crimi-
nal,"'O° the only nonviolent impositions actually covered by his
proposal are cases in which the woman is unconscious or mentally
incompetent, or in which she has expressly refused consent.0 '
The Dripps proposal would thus impose no criminal sanctions in
cases of silence or ambivalence about consent, nor would it punish
cases of express acquiescence produced by nonviolent pressure,
however serious. In a recent Montana case, a high school principal
allegedly got a student's consent to sex by threatening to prevent
her from graduating.0 6 The court held that its sexual assault
statute required a threat of physical harm and that the principal's
alleged conduct therefore was not criminal.' Professor Dripps
evidently would agree with the result, not only as a matter of
statutory interpretation but as a matter of policy. Indeed, he
concludes by "argu[ing] for limiting the reach of criminal liability to
cases in which the defendant either causes sex through violence or
engages in sex over the victim's expressed refusal." 08
Professor Susan Estrich suggests a different approach. She, like
Dripps, would treat an expressed refusal (but not silence or
ambivalence) as sufficient to establish nonconsent. She goes further
101 See Donald A. Dripps, Beyond Rape: An Essay on the Difference Between the
Presence ofForce and the Absence of Consent, 92 COLUM. L. REv. 1780, 1799-1805 (1992).
102 Id. at 1786.
103 Id.
104 Id. at 1800.
105 See id. at 1807 (including these conditions in a model sex offense statute).
1' See State v. Thompson, 792 P.2d 1103 (Mont. 1990).
107 See id. at 1106-07.
108 Donald A. Dripps, More on Distinguishing Sex, Sexual Expropriation, and Sexual
Assault: A Reply to Professor West, 93 COLUM. L. REV. 1460, 1463 (1993) (emphasis
added).
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than Dripps in two respects. She argues that "[t]he 'force' or
'coercion' that negates consent ought to be defined to include
extortionate threats and misrepresentations of material fact."1"
And she concludes that such conduct should be called "rape," not
some other offense."1 This seems a sensible way to begin think-
ing about factors that taint consent. But Estrich unfortunately does
not spell out her notion of either extortion or misrepresentation.
Because her concept of rape could extend even to a partner who
insincerely professes true love for his or her date, many committed
feminists are dubious about Estrich's analysis."1 Without further
detail, the approach seems either plausible but vague, or clear but
far too broad.
The New Jersey Supreme Court's recent, much-discussed
decision in State ex reL. M.T.S."1 adopts a third solution. The case
dealt with the interpretation of a statute punishing conduct as
"sexual assault" when intercourse is committed by "physical force or
coercion."'13 The court held that this requirement is met by the
force inherent in the act of intercourse itself, whenever the act is
nonconsensual.
114
This approach succeeds in criminalizing nonviolent sexual
misconduct but with several costs. The statute prohibiting "force or
coercion," without any mention of nonconsent, is in effect rewritten
to prohibit nonconsensual intercourse without regard to force
(other than that intrinsic to intercourse). Under this view crimi-
nality turns on the validity of consent; the court specified that
consent must be "freely-given"1 but provided no standard for
making this determination, beyond its rejection of physical violence
as a touchstone. Thus, for cases where there is express acquies-
cence, induced by problematic means, the seemingly specific New
'09 ESTRiCH, supra note 7, at 102-03.
110 See id. at 103 ("The crime I have described may be a lesser offense ... but it
is a serious offense that should be called 'rape.'").
II See, e.g., Berger, supra note 96, at 75 (arguing that Estrich's broad conception
of force "may backfire and ultimately damage the cause of women"); Lynne N.
Henderson, What Makes Rape a rime?, 3 BERKELEY WOMEN's L.J. 193, 228 (1988)
(reviewing ESTRICH, supra note 7) (criticizing Estrich for "poorly ... thought out"
proposals that "suffer from the same flaws and difficulties as current laws"). For a
discussion of whether deception should invalidate consent, see Schulhofer, supra note
75, at 88-93.
112 609 A.2d 1266 (N.J. 1992).
..5 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:14-2c(1) (West 1982).
114 See M.T.S., 609 A.2d at 1276-77.
115 Id. at 1277.
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Jersey approach ultimately draws no line at all. And the court
placed such misconduct in the same statutory grading category as
physically violent rape, an offense that is punishable in New Jersey
by a minimum of five years in prison.
116
Dominance is not the way to get at this problem. The underly-
ing concern here is to protect a woman's autonomy in matters of
sexual choice. The autonomy concern needs to be addressed
directly, not as a by-product of definitional debates about force.
3. Protecting Autonomy
Autonomy is not self-defining, of course. Stating the problem
as an autonomy question amounts to a nonsolution if violations of
autonomy are equated with coercion by excessive pressure.
An alternative approach is to define autonomy as the right to
protection from those interferences that our culture and our legal
system already consider impermissible."' This seemingly mini-
malist approach to the problem has unexpected power in serving to
identify sexual behavior that is unambiguously improper.
It is important to stress that in advocating reliance on this very
"thin" conception of autonomy, I do not imply moral approval for
all conduct outside its reach. Many troubling forms of sexual
pressure manage to avoid use of threats that are prohibited by
existing principles within our culture. Economic pressure, for
example, can have powerfully constraining effects on freedom of
action, and decisions to accept sexual intimacy for economic reasons
are appropriately regarded as "unfortunate, unattractive, or
degrading.""' That such pressures will not always violate the
minimalist conception of autonomy I develop here is not a reason
to insulate them from moral or psychological criticism or from the
eventual adoption of more ambitious legal standards. The concep-
tion of autonomy I want to spotlight is not intended as the end of
dialogue or legal development. Rather, it simply offers a baseline
that is relatively uncontroversial in its moral and cultural presuppo-
16 Because M.T.S. was a juvenile case, the trial court was able to grant the
defendant a suspended sentence. See id. at 1269. In an adult prosecution, NewJersey
law would not permit suspension of the minimum five-year term except under "'truly
extraordinary and unanticipated circumstances.'" State v.Johnson, 570 A.2d 395,398
(N.J. 1990) (citation omitted).
117 See Schulhofer, supra note 75, at 69-71 (developing a theory of sexual autonomy
based on existing conceptions of impermissible interference with bodily integrity and
freedom of choice).
"8 Id. at 86.
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sitions. Yet this minimalist starting point has significant power to
extend the scope of available legal protections.
Several examples will illustrate the far-reaching implications of
the conception of autonomy that is already broadly accepted within
our culture. First, when is consent lacking? "No" means no,
obviously. But an intrusion on the person requires more than just
the absence of a clear "no." A physical intrusion on the person
requires actual permission.
Would anyone think that a medical patient's ambivalence, or an
ambiguous "maybe," was a consent to medical treatment or surgery?
Obviously, anything less than clear affirmative permission would
never count as consent. Imagine Atlas, an Olympic weightlifter,
consulting a doctor about whether to have surgery on his elbow.
The doctor really wants to perform the operation. He thinks Atlas
will be very happy with the experience. But the weightlifter is
uncertain. He thinks things may not work out the way the doctor
has promised. And there is a risk of picking up a serious infection.
So Atlas hesitates, says he just is not sure. Can the doctor just go
ahead and start cutting? Would we ever treat the weightlifter's
silence or indecision as equivalent to consent? No, obviously, but
why not? No one compelled him to submit. If he really objected,
all he had to do was say so! Yet we would never consider silence or
ambivalence as equivalent to consent for surgery. To say that is not
to patronize Atlas; it is simply to recognize an obvious violation of
the physical autonomy of his person.
Why should the physical autonomy of a woman's body not be
entitled to the same respect in a sexual encounter? Clear proof of
an unequivocal "no" should not be required. Consent for an
intimate physical intrusion into the body should mean in sexual
interactions what it means in every other context-affirmative
permission clearly signaled by words or conduct." 9 There are
many ways to make permission clear without verbalizing the word
"yes," and permission certainly need not be in writing. But
permission must be an affirmative indication of actual willingness.
Silence and ambivalence are not permission.
12 0
119 See, e.g., WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 9A.44.010(6) (West 1988) (defining consent
to mean "that at the time of the act of sexual intercourse there are actual words or
conduct indicating freely given agreement to have sexual intercourse"); M.T.S., 609
A.2d at 1278 (defining consent as "affirmative and freely-given authorization for the
specific act of sexual penetration").
'20 Contextual differences between surgery and sexual intimacy suggest somewhat
different mechanisms for protecting autonomy in the two situations. The doctor's
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Next, what if a woman does agree? What kinds of constraints
violate her autonomy? Autonomy cannot mean freedom from all
constraints upon choice, but it does entail freedom from those
constraints that our culture identifies as illegitimate. The scope of
that freedom is marked by the rights to bodily integrity and
personal independence that existing legal principles already
protect.121 This modest conception of personal autonomy offers
boundaries that are specific and, yet, far reaching.
One example is sexual harassment in the workplace. This looks
like an area that is hardly ripe for criminal sanctions. But if a
supervisor tries to get sexual favors by offering a promotion (or by
threatening to veto one), he is confronting the employee with
alternatives (no matter whether we call them offers or threats) that
his position gives him no right to impose. If the supervisor used his
position to get an economic payoff from the employee, he would be
guilty of extortion. 122  If a professor threatened to withhold a
good grade or a good recommendation until he got some cash from
a student, again he would be guilty of extortion.
1 2
The worker or student should have the same right to control her
sexuality that she has to control her wages or her bank account.
What makes the woman's consent invalid is not that the supervisor's
act involves too much pressure. What makes the consent invalid is
that rules already settled in our culture deny the supervisor the
right to require an employee to choose between her promotion and
her legally protected interests. One of those interests should be-
and is-her sexual independence. For the same reason, the high
school principal who allegedly obtained sex from a student by
threatening to block her graduation 124 should certainly be guilty
of a crime.
expertise canjustify a special duty of disclosure, and the complexity of the risks may
suggest the need for a conception of informed consent much more stringent than
that which is appropriate in a sexual encounter.
121 See Schulhofer, supra note 75, at 69-71 (discussing the scope and objectives of
legal protection of autonomous choice in the area of sexual intimacy).
122 See MODEL PENAL CODE § 223.4 commentary at 223 (1980) (offering as an
example of extortion the case of a "foreman in a manufacturing plant who requires
the workers to pay him a percentage of their wages on pain of dismissal or other
employment discrimination").
12' See id. (noting as an example of extortion the case of a "law professor who
obtains property from a student by threatening to give him a failing grade or to
influence a prospective employer to hire someone else").
124 See supra text accompanying notes 106-07.
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Two variations will make the implications clearer. Suppose that
a highly paid fashion model wants to land a film role to enhance her
career. The company's casting director says that unless she sleeps
with him, she will not get the part. If you are looking for excessive
pressure, this case will seem a lot harder than that of the student or
employee. You may not feel sympathy for the model at all. But
whether you feel sympathy or not, the violation of her autonomy is
the same as in the previous cases. The man's action is extortionate,
just as if he had insisted on a side-payment in cash. There is an
improper constraint on the woman's freedom of choice under
background rights that are already settled in our culture.
The converse of the model's situation, the "hard case" for this
analysis, is that of a needy mother of four who finds a partner
willing to support her. Suppose that the relationship deteriorates,
and the man threatens to kick her out of the apartment unless she
continues to meet his sexual demands. Obviously, the needy
mother has far less freedom of choice than the successful fashion
model does. But the relevant question has to be whether the man's
threatened actions are illicit. In the model's situation, the pressure
may be slight, but it is clearly impermissible. In the mother's case,
the pressure, though severe, might not be illicit. A sexual quid pro
quo is not a legitimate condition of ordinary employment, but
sexual fulfillment is, for both men and women, an appropriate and
valued goal of ongoing, intimate personal relationships. Thus,
although the man's action in imposing a sexual condition on his
willingness to continue his relationship with the needy mother could
be criticized as insensitive in many contexts, it nonetheless involves
an exercise of his autonomy that society ordinarily considers
legitimate and worthy of social protection. It makes sense to ask
whether the nature of the relationship is sufficient to give her a
right to remain in the apartment or to receive financial support, and
if she does have such a right, the man's threats should render any
consent to sex invalid. But if existing norms do not protect her
from this sort of economic pressure, then her decision to remain in
the relationship, although highly constrained, is not improperly
tainted, and her consent to sex would therefore be valid.
With these principles in mind, we can return to the cases
mentioned earlier-the man who takes the woman's car keys and the
man whose intimidated girlfriend no longer tries to fight back. In
the first case, there is a kind of consent, ultimately the woman says
"OK," but the consent is tainted by a clear violation of her right to
leave. In the second case, there is never any affirmative permission
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at all. These cases make clear that one thing missing in the law of
rape is some way to punish sexual misconduct that is not physically
violent. It is as if we had a law against armed robbery but no law
against theft. The way to fill that gap is not to try expanding what
we mean by force but to have statutes punishing, as an offense
distinct from forcible rape, any sexual imposition without valid
consent. Thus, the men in these two cases should, at a minimum,
be convicted of sexual misconduct.
We get these results without having to sort out degrees of force
and without having to treat women as dominated or disempowered.
The key is in the background structure of rights and privileges that
determine what uses of personal power and institutional position
are permissible, against either the weak or the strong, against either
men or women in our society.
This approach identifies a baseline of existing rights, and it
leaves room for evolution in the standards for valid consent.
Respect for a woman's autonomy should mean that her interest in
controlling her sexual choices receives just as much protection as
any person's interest in controlling her property, her labor, or her
freedom of action in other areas of life.
IV. SENTENCING
I turn now to a set of problems facing female offenders.
Women constitute an ever-increasing proportion of all defendants,
and they are facing increasingly serious charges, especially in the
federal courts.1" 5 One explanation attributes these changes to
women's increasing independence and growing participation in the
workforce."' But this "liberation hypothesis" is now generally
discredited as an explanation for women's apparently rising crime
125 
See BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, WOMEN IN PRISON
3 (1994) [hereinafter WOMEN IN PRISON 1994] ("[T]he number of women sentenced
for a violent offense rose from 8045 to 12,400 during the [1986-1991] period."); RrrA
J. SIMON & JEAN LANDIS, THE CRIMES WOMEN COMMIT, THE PUNISHMENTS THEY
RECEIVE 78 (1991) (reporting that from 1980 to 1985, the female incarceration rate
increased from 11 per 100,000 to 17 per 100,000).
126 See, e.g., FREDA ADLER, SISTERS IN CRIME: THE RISE OF THE NEW FEMALE
CRIMINAL 13-15 (1975) (claiming that women's advances in "fields of legitimate
endeavor" have been paralleled by advances in "the world of major crimes"); RITAJ.
SIMON, WOMEN AND CRIME 19 (1975) (noting that a major hypothesis regarding
women's criminality is that women's participation in financial and white collar crimes
should increase as their participation in the workplace increases, as such participation
will expose them to greater opportunities for committing such crimes).
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rate.12  Thelma and Louise notwithstanding, economic and psycho-
logical liberation seem to play a small role in accounting for the
growth in women's rates of offending.1 28  Far more important
factors appear to be the feminization of poverty and the "War on
Drugs."
129
Along with the increase in the number of women facing long
sentences is a major shift in the way they are sentenced. Until the
late 1970s, American sentencing judges had essentially unbridled
discretion.' This approach seemed to help women, as they often
received less severe punishment than men convicted of similar
crimes."' The reason for this preferential treatment remains
unclear. Some of the differences seem traceable to something like
"chivalry"-male judges felt protective toward a female defendant,
except when she violated gender norms by committing a violent
crime.1 12 Probably a more important factor was judges' desires to
protect the children of convicted women.' In any event, discre-
tion helped women, although maybe not for the right reasons.
But that was the 1950s and 1960s. In the 1990s, sentencing
discretion has gone the way of the dinosaur, especially in the federal
courts. The new order is dominated by mandatory minimums and
inflexible guidelines." 4 Part of the egalitarian spirit of our age is
127 See Joseph G. Weis, Liberation and Crime: The Invention of the New Female
Criminal, CRIME & SOC.JuST., Fall-Winter 1976, at 17, 17 (challenging the assertion
that a causal relationship exists between women's liberation and their criminal
behavior).
121 See, e.g., Roland Chilton & Susan K. Datesman, Gender, Race, and Crime: An
Analysis of Urban Arrest Trends, 1960-1980, 1 GENDER & SOC'Y 152, 167-68 (1987)
(arguing that the most plausible explanation for rising women's crime rates, in
particular black women's crime rates, is their declining economic situation).
12 See id.
'o See Stephen J. Schulhofer, Due Process of Sentencing, 128 U. PA. L. REV. 733,
735-37 (1980) (describing sentencing regimes that were common until the 1970s).
..1 See Ilene H. Nagel & John Hagan, Gender and Crime: Offense Patterns and
Criminal Court Sanctions, in 4 CRIME ANDJUSTICE: AN ANNUAL REVIEW OF RESEARCH
91, 129-34 (Michael Tonry & Norval Morris eds., 1983) (finding that women receive
preferential treatment in the sentencing process); Darrell Steffensmeier & John H.
Kramer, Sex-Based Differences in the Sentencing of Adult Criminal Defendants: An
Empirical Test and Theoretical Overview, 66 Soc. & SOC. RES. 289, 297 (1982) (finding
that "[p]referential treatment of female defendants appears to be consistent ...
across most offense categories").
"I See Nagel & Hagan, supra note 131, at 112-15 (articulating the "chival-
ry/paternalism thesis").
13 See Kathleen Daly, Rethinking Judicial Paternalism: Gender, Work-Family
Relations, and Sentencing, 3 GENDER & SOC'Y 9, 19-22 (1989) (discussing the significant
influence that the protection of children has on the sentencing of female defendants).
' See Stephen J. Schulhofer, Assessing the Federal Sentencing Process: The Problem
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the directive in the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984 that federal
sentencing guidelines must be "entirely neutral" as to the race,
socioeconomic status, and sex of the offender.
3 5
In practice, that neutrality has been a mixed blessing. To
illustrate the paradoxes of neutrality, I will outline the structure of
sentencing under guidelines in the federal courts and then take up
three issues that pose special problems for women: pregnancy,
children, and recidivism.
A. The Federal Sentencing Guidelines
The guidelines promulgated by the United States Sentencing
Commission establish a normal sentencing range for each offense
and identify aggravating and mitigating factors that either alter the
normal sentence range or provide an authorized basis for an upward
or downward departure.' Circumstances not identified by the
Commission are impermissible grounds for upward or downward
departure unless they involve some factor "not adequately taken
into consideration by the Sentencing Commission in formulating
the guidelines." 13 7  Applying the egalitarian mandate of the
Sentencing Reform Act of 1984, the Commission listed a number of
factors that ordinarily cannot justify a departure from the guideline
sentence.' Among the factors "not ordinarily relevant" are age,
mental and emotional conditions, physical condition, and family
responsibilities.'39 Gender is even more suspect. This factor, the
Commission has said, is never relevant. 40
Is Uniformity, Not Disparity, 29 AM. CRiM. L. REV. 833, 851 (1992) (stating that "[t]he
federal sentencing process is pervaded by unwarranted similarities in the treatment
of substantively distinguishable cases"); StephenJ. Schulhofer, RethinkingMandatoty
Minimums, 28 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 199, 200-02 (1993) (describing mandatory
minimums and their goals).
"' Pub. L. No. 98-473, tit. II, ch. II, § 217(a), 98 Stat. 1987, 2019 (codified as
amended at 28 U.S.C. § 994(d) (1988)).
"s See 18 U.S.C.S. app. § IA (Law. Co-op. 1994); see also Stephen Breyer, The
Federal Sentencing Guidelines and the Key Compromises upon Which They Rest, 17
HoFSTRA L. REV. 1, 8-31 (1988) (explaining the background and operation of this
system).
'3 18 U.S.C. § 3553(b) (1988).
138 See 18 U.S.C.S. app. § 5H (Law. Co-op. 1994) (listing offender characteristics
not ordinarily relevant to the determination of whether a sentence should be outside
the applicable guideline range).
.'. 18 U.S.C.S. app. § 5H1.1 (regarding age), § 5H1.3 (regarding mental and
emotional conditions), § 5H1.4 (regarding physical conditions), § 5H1.6 (regarding
family responsibilities).
" See 18 U.S.C.S. app. § 5H1.10.
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Against the background of prior judicial sentencing practices,
these changes will clearly produce more severe sentences for
women. That in itself cannot tell us that the changes are wrong. A
woman convicted of a crime should face the same penalty as a
similarly situated man. But there are several special problems. The
following section explores the problems for women that are
presented by this seemingly sensible conception of neutrality.
B. The Paradoxes of Neutrality
1. Pregnancy
The first problem for a neutrality approach is that men do not
get pregnant. Yet in United States v. Pozzy,14 the First Circuit held
that a defendant's pregnancy ordinarily cannot justify reducing a
long prison sentence that the Guidelines would otherwise
require.
142
The intuition that Pozzy sets an unjustifiably harsh rule is
understandable, and critics of the Guidelines sharply attacked it.
Professor Albert Alschuler14 3 and Professors Marc Miller and Daniel
J. Freed144 argue that the holding in Pozzy is unsound. Professor
Myrna S. Raeder, in the most comprehensive study on the issue,
concludes that "[u]nquestionably, pregnant women ... should be
eligible for downward departures in the current Guidelines
regime."145
This issue, however, is a troubling one, not only for fair
sentencing policy, but for women's interests in particular. No one
likes sending a pregnant woman to prison. But convicted men enter
prison with serious medical problems too. For too long, women's
interests have been undermined by practices that singled out
14t 902 F.2d 133 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 943 (1990).
142 See id. at 138-39. On occasion, district judges in the Second Circuit have
granted downward departures on the basis of pregnancy, without being challenged
on appeal. See Myrna S. Raeder, Gender and Sentencing: Single Moms, Battered Women,
and Other Sex-Based Anomalies in the Gender-Free World of the Federal Sentencing
Guidelines, 20 PEPP. L. REV. 905, 948 (1993) (discussing Second Circuit cases that
neglected to follow the standard set forth in Pozzy).
... See Albert W. Alschuler, The Failure of Sentencing Guidelines: A Plea for Less
Aggregation, 58 U. CHI. L. REV. 901, 911 (1991) (criticizing Pozzy).
'" See Marc Miller & Daniel J. Freed, Offender Characteristics and Victim Vulner-
ability: The Differences Between Policy Statements and Guidelines, FED. SENTENCING REP.,
June-July 1990, at 3, 3-4 (criticizing restrictions on the departure power in cases such
as Pozzy).
.45 Raeder, supra note 142, at 949.
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pregnancy for different treatment than that accorded health
problems in general. 146 Our starting point on this question should
therefore be the assumption that, all else equal, we will strive to
treat pregnancy like other medical conditions. Pregnant women,
therefore, should probably lose on their claim to special treatment,
unless there is reason to treat pregnancy differently from the health
problems that male inmates suffer.
One special feature of pregnancy is that poor medical care in
prison may endanger not only the offender but an innocent party,
the child. If the prison cannot provide safe birthing facilities and
adequate neonatal care, there is surely a case for special treatment.
But because pregnancy, unlike other medical problems, is a short-
term condition, a sentence reduction is not necessary to deal with
this concern; the judge can simply delay the date of entry into
prison until after the child is born. 147  In any event, pregnant
inmates are no longer unusual, and many state and federal prisons
now provide modern facilities that can equal or exceed the quality
of care these women would be likely to receive in the outside
world.
4 8
Other major differences between pregnancy and the medical
concerns of male inmates tend to undermine claims for special
treatment. Pregnancy usually is not life-threatening, and it often
occurs by choice, unlike cancer, for example. As a result, any rule
allowing sentence reductions for pregnancy would have unique
potential for manipulation. 149  I am not enthusiastic about the
results in the pregnancy cases, but on balance the courts are right
to disregard pregnancy in most circumstances.' 50
14 See, e.g., Geduldig v. Aiello, 417 U.S. 484, 494 (1974) (holding that the
exclusion of pregnancy from disabilities covered under a California statute did not
deny women equal protection of the law).
147 This approach will raise a new question, of course: how to deal with the
offender who has responsibility for an infant child. Under some (but by no means
all) circumstances, such family responsibilities couldjustify more lenient punishment
of the convicted mother. For a discussion of this issue, see infra notes 151-60 and
accompanying text.
14 See, e.g., Anita G. Huft et al., Care of the Pregnant Offender, 3 FED. PRISONSJ. 49,
51 (1992) (discussing the health-care facility at Lexington, Kentucky for federal
inmates who have high-risk pregnancies).
19 Cf. United States v. Arize, 792 F. Supp. 920, 921 (E.D.N.Y. 1992) (granting
downward departure where a female drug courier was unaware of her pregnancy at
the time of the offense and where loss of child custody was possible).
"10 The issue needs to be approached case-by-case because pregnant offenders
(many of whom have drug or alcohol problems) often face high-risk pregnancies. If
ajurisdiction's prisons do not have appropriate obstetrical services available, there is
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2. Family Ties
Although pregnancy ordinarily should not be treated differently
from the medical problems that men suffer, a "neutral" approach to
family ties is a different matter. In the old days, white-collar
defendants were able to win leniency by using their family responsi-
bilities to evoke sympathy.1 5 1 Judges were reluctant to take the
breadwinner away from his children, and the ignominy of accusation
and conviction were often viewed as substantial sanctions for the
white-collar defendant.15 2  That instinct helped middle-class
offenders, but the unemployed, especially underclass blacks, often
received harsher sentences. 153  The Sentencing Commission
responded to the race and class biases of the old system by
specifying that community ties, employment, and family responsibil-
ities ordinarily will not justify a departure from the guideline
sentencing range.'
This is generally a sensible rule, but as usual, it was crafted with
men in mind. The "family responsibility" rubric is the same, but the
real problem is different when the defendant is a woman with three
preschool age children. Compared to a male prisoner, a female pri-
a strong case for special consideration. But a similar point can be made with respect
to other medical conditions that cannot be treated properly in prison. A male
inmate's health problems ordinarily endanger only the offender himself, but improper
treatment and consequent risks of permanent injury or death are not permissible
punishments for whatever offense sent the offender to prison. See Estelle v. Gamble,
429 U.S. 97, 104 (1976) (holding that "deliberate indifference to serious medical
needs ofprisoners" violates the Eighth Amendment), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 974 (1977).
'
51 
See STANTON WHEELER ET AL., SITTING IN JUDGMENT: THE SENTENCING OF
WHITE-COLLAR CRIMINALS 152-54 (1988) (reporting that prior to the recent sentenc-
ing guidelines, judges imposed either short sentences or no prison term on white-
collar offenders "to avoid eliminating the [offender's] contribution to community and
family").
152 See id. at 144-45 (reporting that judges typically considered public indictment,
conviction, and loss of community status to be significant forms of punishment for
the white-collar offender and that "fm]ostjudges... wonder whether.the imposition
of additional suffering is justifiable").
'" Available statistical studies do not, however, show unambiguous racial
disparities in sentencing. See 1 RESEARCH ON SENTENCING: THE SEARCH FOR REFORM
93 (Alfred Blumstein et al. eds., 1983) (noting that "[w]hile there is no evidence of
a widespread systematic pattern of discrimination in sentencing, some pockets of
discrimination are found for particular judges, particular crime types, and in
particular settings").
154 See 18 U.S.C.S. app. § 5H1.5-.6 (Law. Co-op. 1994) (stating that employment
records, family ties and responsibilities, and community ties "are not ordinarily
relevant in determining whether a sentence should be outside the applicable guideline
range").
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soner is twice as likely to have dependents who lived with her prior
to her incarceration.' A welfare check can often replace the only
kind of family support that many male offenders ever provide, but
when the mother goes to prison, the children lose their primary
caretaker. This may not be a disaster for the children if the parent
is an abusive drug addict or if close relatives can offer a stable and
supportive home. But children are much more likely to face prob-
lematic alternatives when the incarcerated parent is their mother.
Among male prisoners who have minor children, 88.5% report that
the children are living with their mother, while only 22.1% of the
female prisoners with minor children report that those children are
living with their father.'56 When long-term imprisonment of the
mother will mean uncertain placements in foster care for all of a
child's formative years, the social cost of "neutral" policy can be
enormous. Yet 10.5% of female inmates (compared to only 1.7% of
male inmates) have children who are assigned to a foster home or
to an institutional placement after the parent's incarceration.
1 57
The rule making family ties irrelevant thus creates a false
equality between offenders in very different situations. It also
makes fairness among offenders the sole question, when fairness to
the children should be one of the court's major concerns. Equal
treatment here-if it is equal treatment-can have a devastating effect
on young lives. Yet in most of the federal circuits, courts have been
"fairly hostile to child-based departures," 58 even when the offender
was the single mother of five young children.'59 As a result, the
15' In 1986, 52.6% of all female prisoners, but only 27.5% of all male prisoners,
had been living with minor children just before they entered prison. See BUREAU OF
JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OFJUSTICE, WOMEN IN PRISON 6 (1991) [hereinafter
WOMEN IN PRISON 1991] (noting that 67.5% of female prisoners, but only 54.4% of
male prisoners, had minor children when they entered prison, and that among the
prisoners who had minor children, 78% of the women, but only 50.5% of the men,
had lived with those children before entering prison).
15 See id.
15 See id. (noting that percentages are based on those inmates who had children
under age 18).
" Raeder, supra note 142, at 945; see also United States v. Bieri, 21 F.3d 811,814,
817-18 (8th Cir.) (denying downward departure when both the mother and father of
two children, ages four and seven, were convicted of drug violations), cert. denied, 115
S. Ct. 208 (1994).
'
59 See United States v. Headley, 923 F.2d 1079, 1082-83 (3d Cir. 1991) (finding
that although the district court had the power to depart downward when sentencing
a mother of five, no court that had considered the issue had found parenthood to be
an extraordinary circumstance justifying such a departure); cf. United States v.
Chestna, 962 F.2d 103, 107-08 (1st Cir.) (affirming the district court's denial of down-
ward departure based on the convict's position as the mother of three young
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equal treatment concept has been a disaster, not just for women,
but for sensible policy. What we now need is more discretion, and
more recognition of family ties as a legitimate basis for a shorter
sentence or a less restrictive type of incarceration.
Such an approach need not entail a formal privilege of special
treatment for women as such, because departures presumably
should be authorized for primary caretakers or single parents of
either gender under appropriate circumstances. But the appearance
of formal equality here should not by itself satisfy us that a special
departure rule would be evenhanded and fair. The reality is that
such a departure rule will not look, and will not be, fully neutral
between the sexes. Nearly all of the offenders who will benefit from
it will be women.160 An overwhelmingly disproportionate impact
of this sort should raise serious fairness concerns in most contexts.
What makes such an impact tolerable in connection with sentencing
is the manner in which the incarceration of single parents affects
their children.
3. The Likelihood of Recidivism
Recidivism poses a third problem for the equal treatment
approach. A key factor in determining guideline sentencing ranges
is the need for incapacitation, based on the likelihood of recidivism
and especially the likelihood of future violence. Sentencing tables
reflect judges' perceptions about the potential violence of the
typical offender,6 1 and of course the typical offender is male.
children), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 334 (1992). In the Second and Ninth Circuits, the
courts have been somewhat more willing to view a female offender's family
responsibilities as a permissible basis for a downward departure under some
circumstances. See, e.g., United States v.Johnson, 964 F.2d 124, 129-31 (2d Cir. 1992)
(affirming a downward departure based on extraordinary family circumstances
consisting of the defendant having sole responsibility for raising four young children);
Raeder, supra note 142, at 942-44 (discussing the Second and Ninth Circuits'
willingness to grant a downward departure for single-parent mothers and noting one
case in which the Tenth Circuit did so as well). On occasion, male defendants have
benefitted from such departures as well. See e.g., United States v. Sclamo, 997 F.2d
970, 972-74 (1st Cir. 1993) (affirming downward departure for a man who played an
important role in the development of an emotionally disturbed child with whom he
lived).
o See supra notes 155-57 and accompanying text (discussing the fact that female
offenders are much more likely than male offenders to have dependents living with
them prior to incarceration, and noting that children are more likely to suffer when
the incarcerated parent is their mother).
"I' For example, in the federal system, the U.S. Sentencing Commission generally
attempted to follow typical past practice in setting guideline sentencing ranges for
21911995]
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The danger that a first or second offender will return to crime,
especially to violent crime, is not the same for women as it is for
men. This is not simply a false stereotype. Nor is it an area where
we can make accurate judgments by excluding group generalizations
and by relying entirely upon facts other than the individual's
gender. Women really are different in this respect. Whether as a
result of nature or nurture, and in this case the differences are
probably due to both, women (including female offenders) are far
less prone to violent aggression than are men.
162
Modern equal protection doctrine seems strongly, perhaps
unalterably, opposed to reliance upon statistical differences between
the sexes as a basis for justifying categorical differences in treat-
ment. In Craig v. Boren,161 the Supreme Court held unconstitu-
tional an Oklahoma law that prohibited the sale of 3.2% beer to
males under the age of 21 but permitted sales to females over the
age of 18. 6' The state got nowhere with statistics indicating that
young males were more likely than females to drive while intox-
icated.1 65 The Court noted that the state's statistics were subject to
"obvious methodological problems," and that properly analyzed, the
"statistical disparities between the sexes [were] not substantial." 166
Nonetheless, the Court also stressed broader principles; it con-
cluded that "proving broad sociological propositions by statistics is
a dubious business, and one that inevitably is in tension with the
normative philosophy that underlies the Equal Protection
Clause."
167
Although Craig v. Boren might be explained by the fragility of
the statistical differences that the State invoked, the same is not true
of Reed v. Reed,' 61 Frontiero v. Richardson,169 and Weinberger v.
both first offenders and repeat offenders. See Breyer, supra note 136, at 7 ("[11n
creating categories and determining sentence lengths, the Commission, by and large,
followed typical past practice, determined by an analysis of 10,000 actual cases."
(citations omitted)).
'6 See supra text accompanying note 9. For a discussion of repeat violence by
women who have already committed a first offense, see infra notes 182-83 and
accompanying text.
1- 429 U.S. 190 (1976).
'64 See id. at 190-91.
'6 See id. at 200-04.
'66 Id. at 202, 203 n.16. In one random survey of Oklahoma City drivers, blood-
alcohol levels indicating intoxication were found in 14.6% of the male drivers and
11.5% of the female drivers. See id. at 203 n.16.
167 Id. at 204.
16 404 U.S. 71, 76-77 (1971) (holding that a statutory scheme that draws distinc-
tions between sexes solely for administrative convenience violates the Constitution).
'69 411 U.S. 677, 690-91 (1973) (finding that statutes that accord "differential
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Wiesenfeld. ° In these cases the Court struck down efforts to use
sex as a decision-making factor, even though sex appeared to have
substantial value in predicting an admittedly important fact. In
Reed, the state's apparent premise, in preferring men to women as
administrators for decedents' estates, was that men were more likely
than women to have experience in formal business matters.1 In
Frontiero and Wiesenfeld, Congress had mandated hearings on
dependency for men but not for women seeking certain statutory
benefits, on the ground that husbands were less likely to be
dependent on their wives than vice versa.'72 The Court held that
such generalizations, even if empirically accurate, could not justify
categorically different treatment of the sexes.' 73 The hostility to
empirical generalization in these cases nonetheless may be explained
by two facts. First, the differences between the sexes were them-
selves the products of gender discrimination and cultural impedi-
ments to women's ability to lead independent lives. Second, the
facts for which gender was used as a proxy (business experience and
dependency) could be ascertained more directly and more accu-
rately by a factual hearing.
Closer to the present problem-that is, sharp, statistically valid
gender differences that are not simply the results of past discrimina-
tion-is City of Los Angeles v. Manhart.74 In Manhart, the Supreme
Court barred employers from using male-female differences in life
expectancy as a basis for requiring women as a group to pay higher
pension-annuity premiums. 1 5 Technically, Manhart held only that
the salary differentials violated the nondiscrimination requirements
of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964,17' but the Court's
treatment to male and female members of the uniformed services for the sole
purpose of achieving administrative convenience" violate the Due Process Clause of
the Fifth Amendment).
170 420 U.S. 636,637-39 (1975) (finding unconstitutional a gender-based differen-
tial in Social Security survivors benefits which discriminated against men whose wives
were deceased); see also Califano v. Goldfarb, 430 U.S. 199, 201-02 (1977) (finding
unconstitutional a gender-based differential in Social Security survivors benefits which
required a widower to show dependence on his deceased wife).
171 See Craig, 429 U.S. at 202 n.13.
"1 See Wiesenfeld, 420 U.S. at 644 (noting that "the framers of the Act legislated
on the 'then generally accepted presumption that a man is responsible for the support
of his wife and children'" (citation omitted)); Frontiero, 411 U.S. at 681 (surmising that
Congress intended to make an economical law that took advantage of the fact that
women tend to be the dependant spouse).
173 See, e.g., Craig, 429 U.S. at 202 n.13; Frontiero, 411 U.S. at 688-89.
174 435 U.S. 702 (1978).
17 See id. at 707-11.
176 Pub. L. No. 88-352, tit. VII, § 703(a), 78 Stat. 241, 255 (codified as amended
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reasoning would seem to suggest that such differential treatment
would, in the case of a public employer, violate the Equal Protection
Clause as well."'
One obvious argument for gender distinctions in sentencing is
that, in contrast to the pension-annuity situation, the purpose and
the primary effect of differential treatment in sentencing would be
to help women, not to impose additional burdens on an already
disadvantaged group.17" But the cases leave little if any room for
the "benign purpose" path around the neutrality requirement of the
Equal Protection Clause. Women were more favorably treated by
the gender classifications held unconstitutional in Craig, Frontiero,
and Wiesenfeld. Only when more favorable treatment for women can
be seen as compensating for disadvantageous conditions suffered by
women in the past does the Court seem prepared to uphold gender-
based affirmative action remedies. 1 9 If this perspective is control-
ling, the sentencing of female offenders seems a poor case for
affirmative action preferences. Yet does it really make sense, either
at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (1988)) ("It shall be an unlawful employment practice for
an employer ... to ... discriminate against any individual with respect to his
compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment .... ").
'77 See Manhart, 435 U.S. at 711. Because Manhart was a Title VII case, there was
no need to prove that differential treatment was adopted because of, and not simply
in spite of, the gender of the disadvantaged group. Cf. Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S.
229, 239 (1976) (holding that a facially neutral classification violates the Equal
Protection Clause only when there is proof of purposeful discrimination). But that
requirement appears inapplicable in constitutional challenges to statutes that draw
explicit distinctions along racial or gender lines. See, e.g., Craig, 429 U.S. at 204,210
(holding that an explicit gender-based differential in an Oklahoma statute violated the
Equal Protection Clause, without requiring proof of discriminatory purpose, when the
differential was not substantially related to a legitimate statutory objective). In any
event, the statutory holding in Manhart could be read to imply that categorical gender
differences in sentencing guideline ranges would violate requirements of gender
neutrality in the Federal Sentencing Reform Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-473, tit. II,
ch. II, § 217(a), 98 Stat. 1987, 2019 (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. §994(d)
(1988)), even if such sentencing differentials were supported by statistics indicating
substantial gender differences in the rate and seriousness of recidivism.
178 Of course, seemingly favorable treatment has the potential to reinforce
stereotypes and thus to backfire in the long run. See Orr v. Orr, 440 U.S. 268, 283
(1979) (noting that "[]egislative classifications which distribute benefits and burdens
on the basis of gender carry the inherent risk of reinforcing stereotypes about the
'proper place' of women and their need for special protection"), cert. denied, 444 U.S.
1060 (1980). All "benign" preferences are subject to this caveat.
179 See e.g., Califano v. Webster, 430 U.S. 313, 317-18 (1977) (upholding a Social
Security-related statute which provided higher old-age benefits for women);
Schlesinger v. Ballard, 419 U.S. 498, 505-08 (1975) (upholding differential tenure
periods for male and female naval officers); Kahn v. Shevin, 416 U.S. 351, 355-56
(1974) (upholding a statute granting a larger property tax exemption to women).
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in terms of fairness to women or in terms of effective crime control
policy, to sentence female offenders to the same long incapacitative
sentences that are thought necessary in the case of potentially
violent males?
The gender differences that we are considering are not small.
In the Manhart case, the difference in annuity costs between men
and women was found to be roughly 15%.18 Sex-specific differ-
ences in the propensity for violence in the general population are
roughly 800%-eight to nine times higher for men than for
women.' When the focus is narrowed to individuals who have
already committed one offense, gender differences diminish but
remain substantial. Young men begin their criminal careers earlier
than young women, they commit more offenses of greater serious-
ness, and their criminal careers begin to taper off much later than
those of the women. 1 2 In one study, the propensity for violence
loSee Manhart, 435 U.S. at 705.
181 See supra text accompanying note 9; see also 1 CRIMINAL CAREERS AND "CAREER
CRIMINALS" 25 (Alfred Blumstein et al. eds., 1986) [hereinafter CRIMINAL CAREERS]
(noting that male arrest rates for violent crimes were 8.3 times greater than female
rates for 1980); DarrellJ. Steffensmeier, Sex Differences in Patterns ofAdult Crime, 1965-
77: A Review and Assessment, 58 Soc. FORCES 1080, 1090-92 (1980) (noting that male
arrest rates for violent crimes were nine times greater than female rates for 1965 and
eight times greater for 1977). Independent victimization data corroborate the arrest
data and tend to negate any inference that differential arrest rates are due to
differences in willingness to report or arrest female offenders. See Michael J.
Hindelang, Sex Differences in Criminal Activity, SOC. PROBS., Dec. 1979, at 143, 153
(suggesting that "sex is a central correlate of involvement in the crimes examined and
cannot be dismissed as simply an artifact of biases in the processes culminating in
arrest").
11 See e.g., Deborah W. Denno, Gender, Crime, and the Criminal Law Defenses, 85
J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 80, 82, 94, 104-06 (1994) (basing these conclusions on
empirical data drawn from a longitudinal study of biological, psychological, and
sociological predictors of crime). Similarly, female offenders released from prison are
less likely to commit a subsequent offense and are much less likely to be returned to
prison than are men. See BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE,
RECIDIVISM OF PRISONERS RELEASED IN 1983, at 5 (1989) (finding that while 47.3% of
men released from prison in 1983 were reconvicted within three years, only 38.7% of
women were reconvicted); BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE,
RETURNING TO PRISON 4-5 (1984) (finding that in all states except Massachusetts, "the
proportion of recidivists among males was substantially higher than for female
releasees"). There is some limited evidence to the contrary. In one study of active
heroin users, self-reported crime rates were quite similar for males and females,
except for burglary, an offense for which the average male offender committed five
times more offenses than the average female offender. See CRIMINAL CAREERS, supra
note 181, at 67-68. On the basis of this data, the authors speculated that large
differences in male and female arrest rates arise primarily from differences in rates
of participation in crime, and that once active, females commit crime at rates similar
to those of the active males. See id. at 67. This conclusion may, however, be an
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among young offenders who had already committed one offense was
three times higher for the men than for the women, and among
those who had committed three offenses, 48% of the men but none
of the women went on to commit further crimes.'
88
When the base expectancy of violence is substantially different
for the sexes, and when gender gives us predictive information we
probably cannot get in any other way, neutrality again becomes, in
effect, a form of unjustified discrimination against women.
Particularly in the case of sentences that have a large incapacitative
component, such as recent "three strikes and you're out" legisla-
tion,18 4 there is reason for some discretion to alter the normal
sentence on the basis of gender, and perhaps other factors (such as
age) that are indicative of low recidivism risk. From this perspective
some gender-based differentials in sentencing should have sufficient
justification to pass constitutional muster even under intermediate-
level or "strict" scrutiny. As in the case of family ties, there are
good reasons to support sentencing rules that are not fully neutral
between the sexes.
V. PRISONS
Women's prisons are another major growth sector of the
criminal justice economy. In 1980, there were over 13,000
women in federal and state prisons18 5 and roughly 9000 in county
jails.1 8  We now have over 50,000 women in federal and state
artifact of the focus on the population of active heroin users and appears to differ
sharply from the results observed in birth cohort studies that draw upon a more
representative sample of both offenders and the general population. See, e.g., Neil A.
Weiner, Violent Criminal Careers and "Violent Career Criminals": An Overview of the
Research Literature, in VIOLENT CRIME, VIOLENT CRIMINALS 35, 105 (Neil A. Weiner
& Marvin E. Wolfgang eds., 1989) (finding the male rate of recidivism to be
approximately three times higher for men than for women in the 1958 cohort);
Denno, supra, at 105 (reporting that males are far more likely than females to be
chronic repeat offenders and that "female chronics committed fewer and less severe
crimes than their male counterparts").
l See Weiner, supra note 182, at 105.
184 See, e.g., Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994, Title VII,
§ 70001, Pub. L. No. 103-322, 55 Crim. L. Rep. (BNA) 2365-66 (to be codified at 18
U.S.C. § 3559(c)) (requiring mandatory life imprisonment for defendants previously
convicted of either two or more serious violent felonies, or one or more serious
violent felonies and one or more serious drug offenses); CAL. PENAL CODE
§ 1170.12(c)(2)(A) (West Supp. 1995) (requiring sentencing to an indeterminate term
of life imprisonment in cases where the defendant has two or more prior felony
convictions).
'8 See WOMEN IN PRISON 1991, supra note 155, at 7.
"84 See BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, CORRECTIONAL
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prisons18 7 and another 40,000 in county jails.'8 8  Over one mil-
lion women are incarcerated in local jails at some point each
year.'89 Since the early 1980s, the male prison population has
grown by 112%, while the female prison population has grown by
202%.lgo
The growing number of women in prison partly reflects the
"equal treatment" stance that now governs sentencing. But equal
treatment ends the minute the sentencing hearing is over. Once
offenders enter the correctional system, men and women face
entirely different regimes.
The differences do not always disadvantage women. Physical
danger and insecurity are problems for some female prisoners, but
these risks seldom compare to the pervasive threats of rape and
physical assault that are commonplace for male prisoners.19
Female prisoners face other kinds of difficulties, however.
Women are typically housed in facilities separate from men.
1 92
Moreover, because there are fewer women in prison, the facilities
are usually smaller and draw from a much wider geographical area;
most states have only one women's prison for the entire state.
9 3
In the federal system, the main prisons for women are in West
Virginia, Kentucky, Texas, and California, so women from the
Northeast and Midwest are often sent over one thousand miles from
their homes. 1
94
POPULATIONS IN THE UNITED STATES, 1991, at 13 (1993) [hereinafter CORRECTIONAL
POPULATIONS] (basing estimates on 1978 data).
187 See BUREAU OFJUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OFJUSTICE, PRISONERS IN 1992,
at 4 (1993) [hereinafter PRISONERS IN 1992].
88 See CORRECTIONAL POPULATIONS, supra note 186, at 9.
189 Because jail stays are typically short and because jail census data reflect only
the number of inmates in jail at any one time, such one-day census data greatly
understate the total number of inmates incarcerated over the course of the year. In
1991, a total of over 1,187,454 women were admitted to jail, and 1,154,110 were
released. See BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, JAIL INMATES
1991, at 2 (1992).
190 See WOMEN IN PRISON 1991, supra note 155, at 1.
191 On the problem of rape in men's prisons, see supra note 13 and accompanying
text.
192 
See NICOLE H. RAFTER, PARTIAL JUSTICE: WOMEN, PRISONS, AND SOCIAL
CONTROL 184 (2d ed. 1990) (reporting that of the 80 prisons that held women in
1988,74% excluded males entirely, and several others were almost entirely segregated
by sex).
1" As of 1988, 44 of the states held all of their female inmates at one or two
central locations. See id. at 181.
194 See Sue Kline, A Profile of Female Offenders in the Federal Bureau of Prisons, FED.
PRISONSJ., Spring 1992, at 33, 36.
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Differences in the programs available to male and female
prisoners are striking. Men's prisons in Michigan offer vocational
training in twenty areas, but until recently, the women's prison
offered only five programs-most focused on such skills as short-
order cooking and handicrafts.'95 In Idaho, the women's prison
offers only two vocational programs, one of which teaches the
women how to make decals. 9 In Louisiana, the only program for
women is a sewing class. 197 In Montana, the women's prison has
job slots available to only 18% of the inmates, and only two
programs are offered-sewing and data entry. 9  The Nevada
prison system offers male inmates vocational training in a wide
variety of positions, but the women can choose only from domestic
jobs.'9 9 In Nebraska, the men's penitentiary offers a program
leading to a college degree in business administration, while the
women's prison offers only a certificate-not a degree-in "secretari-
al technology."
20 0
The problem here is not just that women are not offered the
same programs provided for men. Consider the programs that are
offered to the women: sewing, decals, handicrafts, and cooking.
Visiting American prisons in the 1990s is like taking a time machine
back to the high schools of the '5Os, where the boys took Shop, and
the girls learned cooking, baking, and sewing-glorified under the
name of Home Economics.
The major problems for women in American prisons are thus
numbers and "nature."2° ' The number of female prisoners is no
longer so small, but it is still small relative to the number of men in
prison. 20 2  This means fewer programs and greater separation
'9 See Glover v. Johnson, 478 F. Supp. 1075, 1086-87 (E.D. Mich. 1979).
19 See RAFTER, supra note 192, at 188.
197 See id. at 187.
19 See Memorandum of Professor Melissa Harrison Submitted to the Montana
House Appropriations Committee (March 9, 1993) (on file with author).
"9 See McCoy v. Nevada Dep't of Prisons, 776 F. Supp. 521, 525 (D. Nev. 1991).
0 The course in "secretarial technology" was instituted at the women's prison
only when a lawsuit challenging unequal educational opportunities was set for trial.
See Klinger v. Nebraska Dep't of Correctional Serv., 824 F. Supp. 1374, 1399-1402 (D.
Neb. 1993), rev'dsub nom. Klinger v. Department of Corrections, 31 F.3d 727 (8th Cir.
1994), and cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 1177 (1995). Prior to that time, the Nebraska
Department of Corrections had offered no on-site post-secondary education for its
female prisoners, although it offered many college courses and degree programs to
men. See Klinger, 824 F. Supp. at 1399.
2" See RAFTER, supra note 192, at 179 (noting that gender stereotypes motivate
prison programming and affect staff attitudes toward female inmates).
2o2 See PRISONERS IN 1992, supra note 187, at 4 (indicating that women constitute
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from families. Assumptions about women's nature mean that the
programs which are offered tend to deny women the skills they
need for economic and psychological independence.
The third problem for female prisoners-the third "N"-is inertia.
Because male prisoners outnumber women by about twenty to
one,203 and because male prisoners are much harder to control,
men's problems and needs always dominate the agenda of prison
administrators. What women get is the fourth "N"-neglect. Or the
fifth "N"-nothing. Yet, what can be done?
A. Constitutional Litigation
Female inmates have brought many equal protection challenges,
but they have won few real victories. The lack of progress seems
due, in part, to the kinds of problems that pervade all institutional
reform litigation. In 1979, a federal district court found equal
protection violations at Huron Valley, Michigan's only women's
prison, where vocational and rehabilitational opportunities were
substantially inferior to those afforded at the state's prisons for
men.2 4 Yet when the court attempted to appoint an independent
administrator for the facility, after almost ten years of persistent
noncompliance with the court's decree, the Sixth Circuit set aside
the order because "[t]he record ... strongly suggests that the
district court has not attempted to exhaust a number of methods to
enforce its order that are less intrusive." 25 The appointment of
an independent administrator was finally upheld in 1991, fourteen
years after the inception of the litigation.0 6
Most class action suits on behalf of female prisoners have ended
in settlements, with consent decrees promising improvement in
facilities and vocational opportunities. 20 7  Yet gains have been
modest because the consent decrees have proven difficult to enforce
and because states can avoid equal protection problems by simply
cutting back on facilities and programs made available to more
favorably treated prisoners.
20 8
less than 6% of the inmates in American prisons).
203 See id.
See Glover v. Johnson, 478 F. Supp. 1075, 1083-94 (E.D. Mich. 1979).
Glover v. Johnson, 855 F.2d 277, 287 (6th Cir. 1988).
See Glover v. Johnson, 934 F.2d 703, 713-15 (6th Cir. 1991).
2'7 See RAFTER, supra note 192, at 201-02.
*o1 See Molar v. Gates, 98 Cal. App. 3d 1, 20 (4th Dist. 1979) (finding that the state
can comply with equal protection requirements by simply abolishing special privileges
afforded male prisoners rather than granting them to women); see also RAFTER, supra
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Beyond these familiar difficulties shared by all reform litigation
are a series of problems that grow out of the unique complexities
of gender. Does the Fourteenth Amendment require neutrality and
equal treatment, or do differences between men and women permit
different programs and facilities for the two groups? The contend-
ing "isms" of modem feminism do not help much here, and the
theoretical debate over "sameness" versus "difference" has shed
little light on the issues.
In Canterino v. Wilson,20 9 a federal district court found substan-
tial disparities between the programs available to Kentucky's male
and female prisoners. Women had fewer opportunities to qualify
for work-release and study-release programs; they were often denied
minimum-security classification (and thus denied eligibility for
release programs) simply because of an assumption that any social
contact with men would lead to pregnancy. 2"0 The court held that
the women had been denied equal protection, 211 but the Sixth
Circuit vacated and remanded, holding in a brief opinion that there
was no proof that the lesser programs had been afforded to the
women because of their gender.
212
The Eighth Circuit was more explicit in Klinger v. Department of
Corrections.213  The court there held that substantial differences
between programs at Nebraska's men's and women's prisons,
including vocational training for female inmates that was limited to
traditional "women's" occupations and the denial of college-credit
courses, did not violate equal protection because the male and
female prisoners were "not similarly situated for purposes of prison
programs and services." 214 The court supported that conclusion
by noting that, compared to the women's prison, the men's prison
housed six times as many inmates, had a higher security rating, and
the average stay for its inmates was two to three times longer.
215
The court also noted that the female inmates were more likely to be
note 192, at 202 (noting that "[e]ven when a court decides in favor of inmates, the
result is usually only another long struggle to achieve compliance"); Judith Resnik,
The Limits of Parity in Prison, J. NAT'L PRISON PROJECT, Fall 1987, at 26, 28 (noting
that "[c]quality can be achieved either by bringing one group up to the other or by
reducing the benefits of the group that was 'better off'").
2 546 F. Supp. 174 (W.D. Ky. 1982).
210 See id. at 204-06.
211 See id. at 206-08.
212 See Canterino v. Wilson, 869 F.2d 948, 954 (6th Cir. 1989).
213 31 F.3d 727 (8th Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 1177 (1995).
214 Id. at 731.
215 See id.
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single parents and victims of physical or sexual abuse, while the
male inmates were more likely to be violent and predatory crimi-
nals.216 Ironically, the fact that the female inmates were less
violent offenders, incarcerated for shorter periods, for less serious
crimes, became the basis for justifying ess generous programs for
the women.
The Klinger court's justification for disparate treatment of
women in prison stands in sharp contrast to the approach of cases
like Reed v. Reed217 and Craig v. Boren.218  Many of the
differences between the male and female inmate groups are solely
the result of the state's decision to segregate them in separate
facilities. Differences between the men and the women that are
not state created could be relevant for some purposes. I have
argued, for example, that the less violent character of female
offenders can sometimes justify shorter sentences for them as a
group.219  Such differences likewise might have a legitimate
bearing on the kinds of programs best suited to the needs of
particular offenders. But since gender in this context is a crude
proxy for the rehabilitative needs of the individual inmate, statistical
generalizations, even if valid, cannotjustify conclusive gender-based
categories that preclude an individual factual inquiry.20 Nor, in
any event, can any differences between the sexes justify denying
women higher education and well-paid jobs that they need as much
as men do. In the Nebraska prisons, the programs for women are
not only different in content but simply less generous in every
respect.
Although the Klinger court's use of dissimilar situations to
obviate any equal protection inquiry is surely incorrect, it is more
difficult to specify what the nondiscrimination principle affirma-
tively requires in terms of programs and facilities for female
prisoners. The constitutional mandate is obscure, in part, because
there is little agreement about what the right policy directions for
reform should be. The history of prior reform efforts is not
encouraging.
216 See id. at 732.
217 404 U.S. 71 (1971).
218 429 U.S. 190 (1976).
219 See supra notes 161-84 and accompanying text.
22 See supra text accompanying notes 163-84.
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B. The Policy Dilemmas and Their Histoiy
Feminist concern for women in prison predates modern
feminism by close to a century and mirrors many of the modern
themes. Until the latter part of the nineteenth century, female
prisoners were usually housed at the same locations as the men,
although often in a separate wing or annex of the men's build-
ings. 22 ' Typically, large numbers of women were thrown together
in a single large cell, long after the penitentiary system of one-
person cells had been introduced for the men. 222 The women
were also vulnerable to all kinds of exploitation by male prisoners
and guards. 223  In all other respects, female prisoners were
ignored. 24
The enlightened response to nineteenth century prison
conditions was what became known as the Reformatory Move-
ment.225  It stressed rehabilitation for both male and female
prisoners, and its guiding principle for the women was separation-
women were to be housed in separate facilities, supervised by a
separate staff of female guards and administrators. 226 The Refor-
matory Movement was very modern in stressing how women's
different needs created a strong case for separate treatment under
the benevolent guidance of female supervisors.227
2 See RUSSELL P. DOBASH ET AL., THE IMPRISONMENT OF WOMEN 61 (1986)
(discussing the separation of women into exclusive female wings and the appointment
of separate female wardens and matrons in British prisons in the mid-nineteenth
century); RAFTER, supra note 192, at 7 (noting that the Women's Annex built in 1837,
adjacent to the Ohio Penitentiary, was one of the first structures designed specifically
for female prisoners); Lucia Zedner, The Prison for Women, in THE OxFoRD HISTORY
OF THE PRISON: THE PRACTICE OF PUNISHMENT IN WESTERN SOCIETY (Norval Morris
& DavidJ. Rothman eds., forthcoming 1995).
' See RAFTER, supra note 192, at 4.
2 See DOBASH, supra note 221, at 61 (noting that in the mid-nineteenth century
United States, "women were held in cramped, insanitary gaols and often subjected to
sexual assaults by wardens").
24 See RAFTER, supra note 192, at 5 (noting that as a general rule "female prisoners
almost wholly lacked supervision").
22 See id. at 23-82.
See id. at 184.
See id. at 41-51. Similar themes were evident in the development of the federal
government's first prison for women at Alderson, West Virginia. See Claudine
SchWeber, "The Government's Unique Experiment in Salvaging Women Criminals':
Cooperation and Conflict in the Administration of a Women's Prison-The Case of the Federal
Industrial Institutionfor Women atAlderson, inJUDGE, LAWYER, VICTIM, THIEF: WOMEN,
GENDER ROLES, AND CRIMINALJUSTICE 277, 284-85 (Nicole H. Rafter & Elizabeth A.
Stanko eds., 1982) (noting that a mostly female staff ran Alderson).
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The Reformatory Movement's approach to female prisoners had
two serious flaws. First, it linked its conception of women's special
needs and special capacities for rehabilitation to a program that
stressed training in household tasks and domestic service outside
the home.221 Second, it focused primarily on the needs of white
working-class offenders, many of them morals offenders who would
not have been in prison at all if they were men who had engaged in
similar conduct.229  Underclass and minority women usually
remained in strictly custodial institutions, often in wings of a male
prison, and faced extremely harsh regimes of punishment.
20
Nonetheless, for all its flaws, the Reformatory Movement was a
significant step forward for its time. It survived and prospered from
the 1870s until the 1930s. Then a new round of progressive
reforms, which focused on corruption in and mismanagement of
men's prisons, led to pressures for greater professionalism, more
centralized management, and control over the fiefdoms of indi-
vidual wardens in both male and female prisons.23 1 This develop-
ment had nothing to do with the women's prisons per se, but it
doomed their creativity and independence. 212 After the 1930s,
separate women's prisons remained, but they dealt in punishment;
innovative programs were eliminated; women remained separate,
and once again they were neglected.
2 33
11 See RAFTER, supra note 192, at 39 (noting that vocational programs focused on
training female inmates in domestic skills).
' See id. at 35-36 (noting that women were committed to reformatories under
long-term sentences on convictions of fornication, drunkenness, and other minor
crimes for which men typically were not sent to prison at all).
' See id. at 87 (noting that in 1930 Tennessee, "[t]he situation was especially grim
for black women" and that "the 'Negro Wing' was 'almost constantly overcrowded'"
(citation omitted)).
25' See SchWeber, supra note 227, at 287, for an account of these developments
in the federal system. In the individual states, women's reformatories were also
undermined by the financial stresses of the 1930s. Throughout the country, prison
administrators who were pressured for space in their maximum security prisons
transferred out the hard-core female felons who had been held there; these women
'then had to be housed at reformatories. See RAFTER, supra note 192, at 81-82. The
population of less serious offenders who had made up the group in women's
reformatories was either severely diluted by the serious felons or was pushed out
entirely (and transferred to local jails) to make room for offenders who were not
suited to the rehabilitative focus of the reformatory approach. See id.
12 See SchWeber, supra note 227, at 298-99 (chronicling the effects of this change
at Alderson, West Virginia).
' See RAFTER, supra note 192, at 81 (detailing the demise of the Reformatory
Movement).
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In the 1970s, reformers again drew attention to the neglect of
female prisoners. The 1970s reformers attributed most of the
problems to the prevailing policy of separating and centralizing the
female inmates.2 4 The preferred solution was called cocorrections,
essentially coed prisons, where men and women housed in the same
buildings share many programs and facilities. 2 5 The idea was to
reduce geographical displacement and permit cost-effective delivery
of services. 21' Building on the same insight, a 1985 law review
note argued that sexually segregated prisons violate the Equal
Protection Clause and that a gender-neutral system of inmate
assignment for most offenders is constitutionally required. 2 7
Coed prisons have been tried extensively since the 1970s, but
generally they have been a disaster for women. When small
numbers of women are dispersed to coed prisons, they are vastly
outnumbered by the men at each site. Men's needs dominate, and
once again the women get neglected, even more so than before.
238
There is also a concern about safety and security. You do not have
to be a rocket scientist to foresee that there will be security
problems when you mix men and women in coed prisons. It is the
men who pose the problem, but it is much harder to restrict and
supervise the movements of 500 men than to guard closely forty or
fifty women. So the women bear the brunt of tight security
measures in coed prisons.
239
By the late 1980s, most women's advocates and prison adminis-
trators had lost their enthusiasm for coed prisons.240  There
remain several mixed-sex prisons, but they retain few features of the
coed model: prisoners are tightly separated by sex, and there is
little sharing of programs and facilities; 241 in a few instances the
21 See Claudine SchWeber, Beauty Marks and Blemishes: The Coed Prison as a
Microcosm of Integrated Society, PRISON J., Spring-Summer 1984, at 3, 4-5.
23 See id.
2 See id. at 3.
"" See Rosemary Herbert, Note, Women's Prisons: An Equal Protection Evaluation,
94 YALE L.J. 1182, 1182 (1985).
2' See RAFTER, supra note 192, at 204 (noting, for instance, that in coed prisons
"men forced women out of programs by assuming a right to the best positions").
2"9 See SchWeber, supra note 234, at 6-7 ("The burden of upholding this [no
physical contact] policy falls heaviest on women inmates who must often be escorted
or whose activities must be supervised.").
21 See RAFTER, supra note 192, at 184 (describing the demise of the coed move-
ment).
241 New York's Albion Correctional Facility, for example, housed 332 men and 116
women, but the sexes were segregated from one another except in prison industries
and food service jobs, college and health service classes, visiting, and certain special
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only coed feature is the housing in a mainly female prison of a small
number of much older, minimum security males.242 For all
practical purposes, the coed movement is now virtually dead.24
C. Toward Effective Solutions for Female Prisoners
The difficulties of cocorrections drive us back to separating the
women, probably-for many states-in a single, centralized facility.
That means that the best hope for female prisoners may be a
doctrine of separate but equal. No one wants to invoke P"essy v.
Ferguson244 as a shining model, but what is abhorrent for the races
in education may be a sensible solution for the sexes in prison.
A separate but equal approach will require us to have a concrete
working conception of equality, a daunting task in this context. It
makes little sense to afford weightlifting facilities for large numbers
of inmates, as in men's prisons, if the women are not interested in
using them. Nor does it make sense to deny women programs they
do want (like courses in child rearing and prenatal care) just
because such programs are not offered to or demanded by men.
Inmate needs and preferences are one helpful measure of the kinds
of services that should be offered, but this yardstick must be used
cautiously, lest programs simply mirror and reinforce role stereo-
types that the offenders bring with them to prison. Preparation for
jobs and the enhancement of marketable skills should be priorities.
Yet effective pursuit of these goals will sometimes require different
programs for the women. And expenditure levels for men and
women probably should not be held to strict per-capita equality,
since program costs can be much higher for small groups of women
than for large groups of men.
The search has to be for parity in the services delivered to
women and to men. What is needed is what I would call "compara-
ble worth" at the receiving end of the programs. Judged by this
standard, the programs afforded to female inmates in the Nebraska
prison system, although upheld by the court in Klinger,245 should
programs. See SchWeber, supra note 234, at 5.
2,"An example is the 93% female prison at Clinton, New Jersey. See id.
24 See RAFTER, supra note 192, at 184.
244 163 U.S. 537,548 (1896) (holding that the separation of passengers of different
races into separate railroad cars does not violate the Fourteenth Amendment). Pessy
became the basis for the doctrine of separate but equal in education. See Brown v.
Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954) (overruling Plessy).24
5 See supra text accompanying notes 213-16.
2205
2206 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 143: 2151
clearly be regarded as constitutionally inadequate. Comparable
worth may not be the best solution for wage discrimination in the
labor market, 4 ' but it does make sense in assessing programs for
women in prison.
No one concept or doctrine, of course, will magically solve all of
the difficulties. As in the other areas of criminal justice I have
surveyed, theoretical conceptions of neutrality, preferential
treatment, empowerment, and the like are much less important than
the particular strategies used to make feminist goals operational.
Plausible ideas can easily backfire unless they are rooted in a close
analysis of legal and institutional processes, and unless they are
coupled with adequate funding and political support. That makes
reform especially tricky in prisons, because when it comes to
providing services for drug sellers and other offenders, funding and
political support are not in overabundant supply.
247
CONCLUSION
The four topics discussed in this Article make clear the
overriding importance of particulars. Some may wonder whether
the topics are representative-whether I have selected four unusually
intractable problems. But if we wanted to pick issues for their
intrinsic importance to female victims and female offenders, could
we skip domestic violence, rape, sentencing, and prisons?
In stressing the particular and the concrete, I do not aim to
deprecate the contributions of theory. As indicated at the outset,
my concern about the limits of theory states a dilemma. We need
theory, but theory cannot do all the work. The sweeping generaliza-
tions of high theory provide excitement in preaching to the choir,
but too often they prove inapt, unhelpful, or positively counterpro-
24See e.g., Daniel R. Fischel & Edward P. Lazear, Comparable Worth and
Discrimination in Labor Markets, 53 U. CHI. L. REv. 891, 918 (1986) (noting that
comparable worth "has none of the appropriate incentive effects and fails to provide
compensation for past wrongs to the appropriate parties"); Paul Weiler, The Wages
of Sex: The Uses and Limits of Comparable Worth, 99 HARV. L. REV. 1728, 1756-79
(1986) (discussing the difficulties of adopting the comparable worth approach); cf.
Mary E. Becker, Barriers Facing Women in the Wage-Labor Market and the Need for
Additional Remedies: A Reply to Fischel and Lazear, 53 U. CHI. L. REv. 934, 940 (1986)
(developing a case in favor of comparable worth).
247 See Resnik, supra note 208, at 28 (noting that "[a]s overcrowding increases and
interest in rehabilitation diminishes, many vocational and educational programs are
reduced").
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ductive when the time comes to address the problems of working
institutions and the task of producing real improvement for women.
Many strands in contemporary feminism emphasize the
importance of context and particulars as sources of insight into
social and legal conditions that are oppressive to women. 24 A
comparable insistence on doctrinal and institutional specifics is
often lacking, however, in the discussion of proposals to redress
these conditions. What has been missing from the dialogue, and is
now most needed, is a feminism of process and particulars, a
recognition that real solutions are likely to lie very deeply embed-
ded in the details.
Because details are critical, and because change itself is
guaranteed to bring problems, a natural reaction is that the status
quo is not invidious after all. A common response to the feminist
challenge is just the point with which I began-the recognition that
bringing women into the equation is hard to do. For skeptics, this
recognition translates into a do-nothing conclusion. The difficulty
of social and legal change is where the discussion stops. My
approach in this Article has been different. The difficulty of change
was where I started. Change is difficult. But it is also long overdue.
248 See e.g., Bartlett, supra note 6, at 849-63 (discussing feminists who emphasize
reasoning from context); see also MargaretJ. Radin, The Pragmatist and the Feminist,
63 S. CAL. L. REv. 1699, 1707 (1990) (noting that "[p]ragmatism and feminism largely
share ... the commitment to finding knowledge in the particulars of experience").
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